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Pluralism: A Principle for Children’s Rights
Holning Lau∗
Some day, maybe, there will exist a well-informed, well-considered and yet fervent public conviction that the most deadly of
all possible sins is the mutilation of a child’s spirit.
—Erik H. Erikson1
There has been a proliferation of scholarship on the harms caused by
pressures to assimilate2—for example, pressures on Muslims not to wear
their traditional garb, pressures on businesswomen to downplay their motherhood, and pressures on same-sex couples not to display affection publicly. Legal scholars have argued that assimilation demands strike a blow
to a person’s sense of identity,3 imposing unjustiªed psychological burdens.4 Kenji Yoshino has gone so far as to suggest a new civil rights move∗ Harvey S. Shipley Miller Teaching Fellow, UCLA School of Law. Associate Professor Designate, Hofstra University School of Law. J.D., University of Chicago; B.A., University of Pennsylvania. I thank Kerry Abrams, Stuart Biegel, Todd Brower, Kelsi Brown
Corkran, Liz Glazer, Gus Hotis, Russell Robinson, Bill Rubenstein, Sarah Sulkowski, Matt
Warren, and Desmund Wu for comments on earlier versions of this Article. For feedback
speciªcally regarding the Article’s social science components, I thank Ellen Hendriksen,
Curie Park, and Becky Stotzer. Special thanks go to Becky for many helpful conversations
during the Article’s early stages of development. I thank Orly Rachmilovitz, Chris Schreiber, and Mike Weinstein for research assistance and substantive suggestions. Finally, I am
grateful for having had the opportunity to present a version of this Article at the 2006 Los
Angeles Queer Studies Conference at UCLA. Of course, all errors and omissions remain
my own.
1 Erik H. Erikson, Young Man Luther: A Study in Psychoanalysis and History
70 (1958).
2 See Nathan Glazer, Is Assimilation Dead?, 530 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci.
122, 123 (1993) (describing the growing consensus among scholars that “assimilation . . .
is somewhat disreputable, opposed to the reality of both individual and group difference
and to the claims that such differences should be recognized and celebrated”).
3 Drawing from psychological literature, I deªne identity as the sense of self that individuals develop by committing to values and goals associated with particular social categories. Identity must be developed. Thus, for example, an individual of Chinese American
ancestry does not develop a Chinese American identity unless she adopts values and goals
associated with the Chinese American community. Others may label her as Chinese American based on her genes, but she does not possess a Chinese American identity in the psychological sense if she feels no allegiance to Chinese American values and goals.
4 See, e.g., Martha Nussbaum, A New Type of Discrimination: The Prohibition Era, New
Republic, Mar. 20, 2006, at 22:

[A demand] for assimilation to majority norms . . . is profoundly unfair, burdening minorities in ways that majorities are not burdened. Moreover, the demand is
fraught with psychological danger. How can a person really have equality when
she has to push some of her most deeply rooted commitments under the rug, treating them as something shameful and socially inappropriate?
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ment that focuses on protecting a person’s right not to assimilate and to
live a life that is centered on an “uncovered,” authentic identity.5
The existing legal scholarship on identity and assimilation focuses
on adults. In this Article, I bring the discussion full circle, back to where the
concept of identity ªrst arose—the context of childhood. The concept of
identity was not commonly used until the 1950s, when psychologist Erik
H. Erikson introduced the terms “identity” and “identity crisis” in his
works on children.6
Consider Kenji Yoshino’s works on assimilation, in which he argues
that it is troubling when an employer requires her gay (adult) employees to
hide their same-sex relationships, demanding that employees assimilate
to a heterosexual norm.7 What happens when we shift the focus from the
ofªce to the schoolhouse? Is it equally, less, or more troubling when a public high school punishes students who openly display same-sex affection
and threatens to out those students to their parents?8 This Article contends
that cases involving children are more troubling than cases involving adults
and that the law should account for that fact. The developmental state of
childhood renders children particularly vulnerable to the harmful effects
of assimilation demands.

Throughout this Article, I focus on the harmful effects of demands to assimilate and not on
assimilation itself, which may be uncoerced. For examples of legal scholarship on these
demands, see Katharine T. Bartlett, Only Girls Wear Barrettes: Dress and Appearance
Standards, Community Norms, and Workplace Equality, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 2541, 2562–65
(1994) (discussing costs associated with gender-based assimilation); Devon W. Carbado &
Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 Cornell L. Rev. 1259, 1279–93 (2000) (discussing
costs associated with race-based assimilation) [hereinafter Carbado & Gulati, Working
Identity].
5 Kenji Yoshino, Covering: The Hidden Assault on Our Civil Rights 27, 184–
96 (2006). Borrowing from sociologist Erving Goffman, Yoshino uses the term “covering”
to refer to the “ton[ing] down” of particular identity traits to ªt into the mainstream. Id. at
ix.
6 See Erik H. Erikson, Childhood and Society (1950); Erik H. Erikson, Identity
and the Life Cycle (W. W. Norton & Co. 1980) (1959) [hereinafter Erikson, Life Cycle]; Erik H. Erikson, Identity, Youth, and Crisis (1968) [hereinafter Erikson, Youth
and Crisis]; Erik H. Erikson, Youth: Change and Challenge (1963); see also Glazer,
supra note 2, at 124–25 (acknowledging that the concept of identity was introduced by
Erikson through his works on children); Ruben G. Rumbaut, The Crucible Within: Ethnic
Identity, Self-Esteem, and Segmented Assimilation Among Children of Immigrants, 28
Int’l Migration Rev. 748, 753 (1994) (same).
7 See Yoshino, supra note 5, at 69–70 (criticizing the federal government’s “Don’t
Ask, Don’t Tell” policy for requiring gay service members to hide their sexual orientation);
id. at 93–101 (criticizing Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097 (11th Cir. 1997), in which the
court upheld the government’s withdrawal of an employment offer from a lesbian because
she ºaunted her same-sex relationship).
8 This question is inspired by the pending case of C.N. v. Wolf, in which a high school
disciplined a lesbian student for being affectionate with her girlfriend and outed the student to her parents, even though the school allegedly never punished opposite-sex couples
for similar conduct. 410 F. Supp. 2d 894 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (granting in part and denying in
part defendants’ motion to dismiss); see also Seema Mehta, Lesbian Student Files Discrimination Lawsuit, L.A. Times, Sept. 8, 2005, at B3.
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Public policies often require children to conform to majoritarian
community standards.9 Of course, requiring children to conform may sometimes be desirable and not harmful. Children need to learn and adopt some
basic social norms in order to grow into well-functioning members of society.10 Socialization of children can be as innocuous as requiring schoolchildren to raise their hands before speaking and to wait patiently in line
in the cafeteria. However, socialization processes become harmful when
they require children to suppress their identities.11 For example, forbidding girls to wear headscarves in school psychologically burdens many
Muslim schoolgirls, for whom headscarves are an identity trait.12
The remainder of this Article contains three arguments: a normative
policy argument in Parts I and II, a descriptive legal argument in Part III,
and a prescriptive legal argument in Part IV. In Part I, I argue that children are harmed when they are pressured to suppress traits of minority social groups in order to ªt into the mainstream.13 Allegiance to a minority
group informs an individual’s identity.14 Accordingly, suppression of mi9 See Kenneth L. Karst, Law, Cultural Conºict, and the Socialization of Children, 91
Cal. L. Rev. 967 (2003); Hillary Rodham, Children Under the Law, 43 Harv. Educ. Rev.
487, 490 (1973).
10 See Nussbaum, supra note 4, at 26.
11 As discussed infra in Part I, the suppression of identity generates particular psychological burdens.
12 In 2004, France banned the wearing of “ostentatious” religious symbols, including
headscarves, in public schools. See Law No. 2004-22 of Mar. 15, 2004, Journal Ofªciel de
la République Française [J.O.] [Ofªcial Gazette of France], Mar. 17, 2004, p. 5190. For
commentary on the law’s psychological impact on Muslim girls, see Adrien Katherine
Wing & Monica Nigh Smith, Critical Race Feminism Lifts the Veil?: Muslim Women,
France, and the Headscarf Ban, 39 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 743, 777–83 (2006).
Recall that the term “identity” refers to the sense of self that individuals develop by
committing to values and goals associated with particular social categories. Accordingly, I
use the term “identity trait” as a shorthand (that is not part of psychology jargon) to refer
to traits that have special value or represent particular goals to people within an identity
group. Headscarves may seem like ordinary pieces of clothing to many people; however,
they are an identity trait for Muslims who place special value on headscarves.
13 In this Article, I focus on minority social groups based on race, ethnicity, religion,
political opinion, disability, sexual orientation, and gender identity. Traditionally, prejudice
has been based on these statuses, rendering them particularly relevant to a person’s selfawareness. Although trait suppression manifests differently across these statuses, a common
denominator is that coerced suppression of these statuses burdens children psychologically.
For a discussion addressing the question of slippery slopes, see infra text accompanying notes 137–141. For example, can shy students constitute a minority social group and,
therefore, oppose all public speaking assignments? I answer in the negative and explain
that such slippery-slope concerns are unwarranted.
14

[O]rdinary discourse differentiates people according to social groups such as women
and men, age groups, racial and ethnic groups, religious groups, and so on. Social
groups of this sort are not simply collections of people, for they are more fundamentally intertwined with the identities of the people described as belonging to
them.
Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference 42–43 (1990); see Linda
R. Tropp & Stephen C. Wright, Ingroup Identiªcation as the Inclusion of Ingroup in the
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nority traits undermines that identity, exacting a psychological toll. The
law should endeavor to prevent such psychological burdens.15
That goal can be realized through pluralism, the making of space for
difference.16 Thus, in Part II, I propose a two-pronged pluralism principle
for children’s rights jurisprudence.17 The ªrst prong dictates that, while
socialization of children is generally acceptable, the state must avoid socialization policies that undermine a child’s ability to develop and express
her identity (which I refer to as “identity interests”). However, according
to the second prong, the state can restrict a child’s exercise of identity interests if protecting that exercise would cause cognizable harms to the child
or to others.18
Self, 27 Personality & Soc. Psychol. Bull. 585, 585–86 (2001) (surveying psychological literature that acknowledges that “the self is construed in relation to one’s group memberships”).
Group status is particularly relevant to individuals’ sense of self when the group is an
oppressed minority group. See Harper v. Poway Uniªed Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d. 1166, 1183
n.28 (9th Cir. 2006):
There is, of course, a difference between a historically oppressed minority group
that has been the victim of serious prejudice and discrimination and a group that
has always enjoyed a preferred social, economic and political status. Growing up
as a member of a minority group often carries with it psychological and emotional
burdens not incurred by members of the majority.
See also Margaret E. Montoya, Máscaras, Trenzas, y Greñas: Un/Masking the Self While
Un/Braiding Latina Stories and Legal Stories, 15 Chicano-Latino L. Rev. 1, 13–15 (1994)
(arguing that the suppression of minority traits is a particularly harmful form of conformity); Russell K. Robinson, Uncovering Covering, 101 Nw. U. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2007)
(on ªle with author) (same).
15 I do not suggest that the law should prevent all psychological burdens on children.
For example, even though a child may experience stress from having a favorite television
show canceled, I do not argue that the law should intervene. Accepting respected commentators’ existing arguments that the law should prevent the particular psychological harms of
assimilation demands, this Article simply contends that those commentators’ main points
are especially pressing for children; the Article does not make broad arguments about general psychological burdens.
16 Although commentators often write about speciªc forms of pluralism (e.g., political
pluralism, cultural pluralism, religious pluralism), I use the term pluralism to refer to the
making of space for difference within identity categories generally.
17 The pluralism principle builds on Emily Buss’s developmentalist approach to children’s rights, which asserts that in deciding what autonomy rights to extend to children,
the government should consider the developmental beneªts and harms of such extensions.
See Emily Buss, Allocating Developmental Control Among Parent, Child, and the State,
2004 U. Chi. Legal F. 27, 35 [hereinafter Buss, Allocating Developmental Control].
18 In Part II.B, infra, I deªne cognizable harms to include only a narrow range of consequences. Indeed, harms cognizable under the pluralism principle are not synonymous
with harms in common parlance.
This prong is partly inspired by John Stuart Mill’s time-honored harm principle. See
John Stuart Mill, On Liberty and Other Essays (John Gray ed., 1998). The pluralism principle clearly differs from Mill’s harm principle because Mill explicitly excluded
children from his principle’s coverage. See id. at 14. Also, whereas Mill only was concerned with harms to others, the pluralism principle is concerned with children’s harms to
themselves as well. See Joel Feinberg, Harm to Self: The Moral Limits of the
Criminal Law 69, 325–33 (1984).
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In Part III, I show that the pluralism principle is already emerging in
jurisprudence on children’s constitutional rights, even though courts and
commentators have never clearly articulated the principle.19 Critics charge
that the Supreme Court’s children’s rights jurisprudence lacks coherence.20
However, the Court’s decisions are not inconsistent when viewed in light
of the pluralism principle. The principle helps to explain why the Court has
recognized children’s rights in some instances and refused to do so in others.
Explicitly acknowledging the pluralism principle would reconcile the seemingly inconsistent decisions while at the same time realizing the policy
goal of protecting children’s identity interests.
In Part IV, I present a case study on issues concerning gay and lesbian youth to illustrate how the pluralism principle should inºuence developing law.21 Questions regarding gay and lesbian youth have elicited
much attention. Lower courts have provided inconsistent answers to these
questions due to divergent interpretations of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on children’s rights. That divergence stems from a failure to see
and implement the pluralism principle.
Do gay and lesbian youth have a right to display romantic affection
at school and to organize gay pride events at school?22 Can a public school
protect gay and lesbian youth from hate speech without violating the Constitution?23 Do gay and lesbian youth have a right to privacy that includes a
19 Note that my current project focuses on children’s constitutional rights. Thus, it only
addresses children’s claims against the state. It does not address children’s claims against
their parents, nor does it cover parents’ claims against the state. I do address, however, how
parental interests might inºuence children’s claims against the state. See infra Part II.C.2.i.
20 See Martin Guggenheim, What’s Wrong with Children’s Rights 12 (2005)
(“[T]he children’s rights movement has been a confused and often ridiculed one . . . . Nearly
forty years after the movement began, it has made very little progress developing a cogent
conceptual position.”); Nancy E. Walker, Children’s Rights in the United States 10
(1999) (“[C]ourts have answered [the question of children’s rights] in inconsistent ways.
Certain pronouncements make the rights of children explicit, but other U.S. Supreme Court
opinions reºect a paternalistic view.”); Martha Minow, What Ever Happened to Children’s
Rights?, 80 Minn. L. Rev. 267–77 (1995) (“The Court’s ambivalence swings between two
starkly contrasting alternatives. One would extend adult rights to children; the other would
treat children in important ways as subject to different authorities.”) [hereinafter Minow,
Children’s Rights]; Rodham, supra note 9, at 487 (“The phrase ‘children’s rights’ is a slogan in search of deªnition.”); Lee E. Teitelbaum, Children’s Rights and the Problem of
Equal Respect, 27 Hofstra L. Rev. 799, 799 (1999) (“Few areas present more difªcult
problems than does the deªnition of the rights of children.”).
21 Sexual orientation issues make for an illustrative case study because gays and lesbians are subject to a uniquely wide variety of assimilation demands. See Kenji Yoshino,
Covering, 111 Yale L.J. 769, 772 (2002).
22 Lower courts have issued disparate interpretations of the Supreme Court’s case law
on student expression. One court has held that bringing a same-sex partner to a high school
prom is protected speech. See Fricke v. Lynch, 491 F. Supp. 381 (D.R.I. 1980). Other
courts maintain that school ofªcials have broad discretion to censor student expression.
See, e.g., Boroff v. Van Wert City Bd. of Educ., 220 F.3d 465, 471 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding
that school ofªcials may prohibit a student from wearing a T-shirt with “illustrations of
[the musician] Marilyn Manson largely unadorned by text” because Manson “promotes
disruptive and demoralizing values”).
23 Compare Harper v. Poway Uniªed Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1171 (9th Cir. 2006)
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right not to be outed by school ofªcials?24 The pluralism principle offers
a normatively desirable, uniªed approach to these questions.
In the Conclusion, I take a cursory look at how the pluralism principle should inºuence laws affecting children who identify with other minority groups, such as religious and ethnic groups.25 In doing so, I invite
discussion on how the law should remedy assimilation-based wounds suffered by children.
I. Assimilation Demands and Their Effects on Children
How do the harms of coerced assimilation speciªcally affect children?
Assimilation demands are disproportionately harmful to children because
children lack the emotional maturity that helps adults cope with psychological burdens.26 Older children are often the most vulnerable to assimilation harms. Not only do adolescents27 generally have less coping capacity than adults, but they are also at the stage of development in which
people are most preoccupied with identity issues.28 Combining those two
factors, adolescents not only are less capable of weathering the storms of
assimilation demands, but also are situated in a storm zone.
In this Part, I ªrst present existing legal scholarship on assimilation’s
harms. Then, I relate that scholarship to social science literature on children’s coping capacity and identity development.

(holding that a public school did not violate the First Amendment by prohibiting a student
from wearing a T-shirt that condemned homosexuality), with Nixon v. N. Local Sch. Dist.
Bd. of Educ., 383 F. Supp. 2d 965 (S.D. Ohio 2005) (reaching the opposite conclusion in a
case with nearly identical facts), and Hansen v. Ann Arbor Pub. Sch., 293 F. Supp. 2d 780
(E.D. Mich. 2003) (holding that a public school violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments by refusing to allow individuals who would condemn homosexuality from participating in a panel discussion). Some courts have held that schools’ antiharassment policies
violate the First Amendment. See, e.g., Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200
(3d Cir. 2001); Pyle v. S. Hadley Sch. Comm., 861 F. Supp. 157 (D. Mass. 1993).
24 A student is asserting this controversial privacy claim in the pending case of C.N. v.
Wolf. See Mehta, supra note 8.
25 These groups are not mutually exclusive, of course.
26 See infra Part I.B.1.
27 I use the term “adolescents” to refer to a subset of “children,” as opposed to an entirely distinct category, because the law has traditionally done so. For example, in Bellotti
v. Baird, the Court addressed the rights of pregnant teenagers, yet referred to those teenagers’ rights as “children’s rights.” See, e.g., 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979). Similarly, the international human rights community treats adolescents as a subset of children. See United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 1, Nov. 20, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1448 (“For the
purpose of the present Convention, a child means every human being below the age of eighteen years unless under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier.”) But see
Elizabeth S. Scott, The Legal Construction of Adolescence, 29 Hofstra L. Rev. 549
(2000) (arguing for recognition of adolescence as a distinct legal category).
28 See infra notes 75, 78–83 and accompanying text.

2007]

Pluralism: A Principle for Children’s Rights

323

A. Assimilation’s Flaws
1. History
Assimilation has long played a prominent role in American society.
In the context of immigration, the “melting pot” ideal went largely unchallenged until recently.29 According to this romantic metaphor, Americans of diverse ancestral backgrounds would “melt” into a uniªed blend of
American identity.30
Progressives of the early twentieth century believed that the uniªed
blend of American identity would constantly change over time, absorbing
new characteristics from immigrants as they melted into the blend.31 As discussed below, however, assimilation has not lived up to this metaphor.
The demands of assimilation usually require immigrants and other minority
groups to abandon, rather than contribute, traits that they value to melt
into the existing American mainstream. Indeed, the term “assimilation” now
generally refers to the process by which minority groups abandon, hide,
or downplay their identity traits in an attempt to ªt into the mainstream.32
Even if minorities do contribute some of their characteristics to a
uniªed American identity,33 the melting pot ideal is nonetheless troubling
because blending identities still requires people to abandon, hide, or downplay some, though perhaps not all, of the identity traits that they value.34
Accordingly, many commentators have discarded the melting pot imagery,
embracing other metaphors such as salad bowls and mosaics, in which
individual ingredients of the salad or individual pieces of the mosaic re-

29 The term “melting pot” derives from the play The Melting-Pot by Israel Zangwill,
ªrst performed in 1908. See Israel Zangwill, The Melting-Pot (1909). Kenji Yoshino
asserts that criticisms against the melting pot grew out of the civil rights movement of the
1960s. See Yoshino, supra note 5, at xi. Camille Gear Rich believes that it was not until
the 1990s that most Americans abandoned the melting pot ideal. See Camille Gear Rich,
Performing Racial and Ethnic Identity: Discrimination by Proxy and the Future of Title
VII, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1134, 1234 (2004). Even today, however, some political ªgures, such
as Pat Buchanan, openly idealize the melting pot despite the criticism against it. See, e.g.,
Patrick J. Buchanan, State of Emergency: The Third World Invasion and Conquest of America (2006).
30 For background on the melting pot, see Peter H. Schuck, The Perceived Values of
Diversity, Then and Now, 22 Cardozo L. Rev. 1915, 1927–28 (2001).
31 Id.
32 The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (4th ed. 2000)
deªnes assimilation as “[t]he process whereby a minority group gradually adopts the customs and attitudes of the prevailing culture.” Kenji Yoshino describes three forms of assimilation: conversion (i.e., abandoning traits), passing (i.e., hiding traits), and covering (i.e.,
downplaying traits). See Yoshino, supra note 5, at 17–18.
33 Mainstreaming of minority culture does occur to some degree. Cf. Howard Winant, Racial Conditions 26 (2002) (discussing the inºuence that blacks have had on
mainstream American music).
34 In Part I.A.3, infra, I recognize that pressuring people to relinquish personal traits
they value is not troubling under exceptional circumstances, for example, when exercising
a behavioral trait harms others.
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tain their original characteristics while contributing to the overall ºavor
or picture.35
2. Harmful Effects
Legal commentators have identiªed both macro and micro levels of
harm associated with assimilation demands. At the macro level, pressures
to assimilate are harmful because they reinforce social dynamics that
subordinate traditionally disadvantaged groups. For example, the pressure
on racial and ethnic minorities to “act white” reinforces white supremacy.36 When an employer bans traditionally black hairstyles from the workplace, she is demanding conformity with a white standard of beauty, which
mainstream society assumes to be superior.37 By maintaining her grooming code, the employer reinforces that notion of white superiority.38
Similarly, pressures on Muslim women to remove their veils, and on
Jewish men to remove their yarmulkes, reinforce notions of Christian supremacy.39 The pressure on businesswomen to hide their childcare responsibilities reinforces patriarchy.40 And the pressure on gays and lesbians to
downplay their romantic relationships in public reinforces heterosexism.41 In
these ways, pressures to assimilate reinforce oppressive social norms.
At the micro level, assimilation demands take their toll on individuals by imposing psychological costs. According to psychologists, a healthy
identity requires congruence between one’s inner sense of self and one’s
outward representations of that self.42 Assimilation demands can undermine
that congruence, creating a psychological burden.43
35 See John Rhee, Theories of Citizenship and Their Role in the Bilingual Education
Debate, 33 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 33, 37 n.20 (1999); Rich, supra note 29, at 1234.
36 See Yoshino, supra note 5, at 132–36.
37 See Rogers v. American Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (upholding
an employer’s restriction on braided hairstyles against a Title VII challenge, even though
an employee argued that her hairstyle was an expression of black identity). According to
Paulette M. Caldwell:

[B]lack women who are permitted to break through the barrier of racial exclusion
into “visible” jobs involving public contact are likely to be those who possess physical characteristics close to those of women of the dominant racial group . . . .
Rather than focusing on the black woman herself, the impetus to exclude is transferred to the black woman’s hair.
Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and Gender,
1991 Duke L.J. 365, 391 (1991).
38 See Caldwell, supra note 37, at 391.
39 See Yoshino, supra note 5, at 169–70.
40 See id. at 142–66, 177.
41 See id. at 93–101.
42 See infra notes 84–86 and accompanying text.
43 See infra notes 84–86 and accompanying text. While an individual subjected to assimilation demands bears a psychological burden, she might also “export” some of that
burden to her family. See Zachary Kramer, After Work: Family Harms in Employment Discrimination Law, 95 Cal. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2007).
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Consider, for example, that some employers pressure their black employees to suppress traits that the employees value as racial traits.44 Lakisha,45 who once regularly wore cornrows and kente scarves, may submit
to that pressure and adopt the name Mary, straighten her hair with synthetic
chemicals, and abandon her kente scarves.46 In doing so, Lakisha, now Mary,
dons a mask. Lakisha’s expressed self, her mask, is no longer congruent
with her inner sense of self; this incongruity inºicts a psychological wound.
Employers’ assimilation demands suggest to Lakisha that black identity
is inferior and unworthy of respect.47 For Lakisha, who identiªes with black
culture despite her mask, that suggestion of inferiority demeans her inner
sense of self and can produce self-hatred.48
Under statutory employment law, employers may not refuse to hire
Lakisha simply because she is of African descent, but they generally may
refuse to hire her for openly expressing black identity.49 Lakisha is left
with a harrowing decision: sacriªce ªnancial livelihood or assimilate and
betray her sense of self.50 Excoriating this tradeoff between dignity and
ªnancial health, commentators have argued for statutory reform,51 rein-

44 See Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Fifth Black Woman, 11 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 701 (2001) [hereinafter Carbado & Gulati, Fifth Black Woman]; Carbado &
Gulati, Working Identity, supra note 4, at 1279–93.
45 Economists Marianne Bertrand and Sendhil Mullainathan found that having a name
associated with African American culture, such as “Lakisha” or “Jamal,” signiªcantly reduces one’s likelihood of receiving a job interview. Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Employable Than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9873, 2003), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w9873.
46 Some parts of this example are borrowed from Carbado and Gulati’s “ªfth black
woman” hypothetical. See Carbado & Gulati, Fifth Black Woman, supra note 44, at 710–
21.
47 See supra notes 36–38 and accompanying text (discussing assimilation demands that
derive from white supremacy).
48 See Carbado & Gulati, Working Identity, supra note 4, at 1277 (describing assimilation processes as “self-negating” and “self-denying”); Martha Chamallas, Structuralist and
Cultural Domination Theories Meet Title VII: Some Contemporary Inºuences, 92 Mich. L.
Rev. 2370, 2408 (1994) (“To be forced to suppress one’s cultural identity . . . is insulting
and demeaning.”); Montoya, supra note 14, at 13 (“[Wearing] masks of acculturation can
be experienced as self-hate.”).
49 See Rich, supra note 29, at 1137 (“[I]t has long been established that Title VII does
not prohibit discrimination based on ‘voluntary’ or ‘performed’ aspects of racial or ethnic
identity.”).
50 Even by betraying her sense of self, Lakisha suffers an economic burden. Commentators have noted that repackaging oneself requires time, effort, and signiªcant cash expenditures. See Carbado & Gulati, Working Identity, supra note 4, at 1279 & n.43.
51 See, e.g., Juan F. Perea, Ethnicity and Prejudice: Reevaluating “National Origin”
Discrimination Under Title VII, 35 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 805, 809 (1994) (proposing an
expansion of Title VII to protect expressions of ethnicity).
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terpretation of existing statutes,52 and extralegal remedies such as greater
public discourse on assimilation’s harms.53
3. Circumscribing the Criticism
Before proceeding to a discussion of assimilation in childhood contexts, I should clarify that criticism of pressures to conform is not absolute.
The criticism should be circumscribed for three main reasons. First, not
all socialization demands produce psychological harms. For example, there
is innocuous social pressure to conform to unwritten codes of politeness—to
say “thank you,” to hold the door for others, and to offer one’s bus seat to
the elderly. Generally speaking, one would be hard-pressed to argue that
such conformity compromises anyone’s identity.54 Moreover, pressure to
conform is less offensive when it manifests in the form of encouragement. The pressure is most harmful when it is a coercive demand. For
example, it is one thing for the state to encourage patriotism with a recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance in schools; it is quite another thing to
coerce patriotism by suspending students who refuse to participate in the
salute.55
Second, even when assimilation demands undermine individuals’ identity, those demands may be justiªed. For example, a man may identify
with a particular ethnic group that traditionally condones wife battering.
Assimilating to social norms against domestic violence may contradict that
man’s identity; however, the state can justify requiring that man to conform to social norms against domestic violence because wife beating creates both physical and psychological harms to others.56 In proposing a
legal solution to assimilation demands on children, I am cognizant that,
when social conformity prevents legitimate harms, assimilation demands
should be allowed. I deªne those legitimate harms in detail below, in Part
II.B.
52 See, e.g., Caldwell, supra note 37, at 385–90 (arguing for an interpretation of Title
VII that protects expressions of racial identity); Rich, supra note 29, at 1202–12 (arguing
for an interpretation of Title VII that protects performances of racial and ethnic identities
through behavioral traits).
53 See, e.g., Yoshino, supra note 5, at 178 (proposing that parties who make assimilation demands and parties who are burdened by demands should have “reason-forcing conversations” to discuss whether the demands are justiªable).
54 One could certainly argue that one is impolite and that impoliteness informs one’s
sense of self. However, self-concept is not synonymous with identity. Identity is the part of
one’s self-concept that is developed by committing to particular values and goals associated with social categories. Suppression of one’s identity generates unique harms. See infra
note 95 and accompanying text.
55 See W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (holding mandatory participation in the Pledge of Allegiance in schools unconstitutional). For a discussion of Barnette, see infra notes 182–187 and accompanying text.
56 Cf. Nancy S. Kim, Blameworthiness, Intent, and Cultural Dissonance: The Unequal
Treatment of Cultural Defense Defendants, 17 U. Fla. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 199 (2006) (noting that cultural defenses to violent crimes are largely unsuccessful).
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Third, I believe that assimilation demands are sometimes less troubling when individuals are able to avoid the demands by exiting the situation. For example, a church’s demands on its congregation and a political
party’s demands on its members are less troubling so long as members
can exit the group with ease.57 Children, however, usually lack the ability
to avoid assimilation demands by exiting. Two major sources of assimilation demands on children are their parents and the state. Children rely on
their parents and the state for support, and thus these sources are difªcult
for children to avoid. In this Article, I focus on crafting a legal response to
assimilation demands from the state. Although parents’ assimilation demands on children can also cause psychological wounds, the unique challenges to crafting a legal response to parents’ assimilation demands warrant discussion in a separate article.58
B. The Case of Children
The assimilation harms identiªed by legal scholars are magniªed when
assimilation is demanded from children, especially adolescents. Children
are more vulnerable to these harms because their capacity to deal with
stressors is less than that of adults. Adolescents are particularly vulnerable because they are at a stage of development during which individuals
are most preoccupied with the psychological task of identity formation.59
Thus, adolescents struggle with more identity-related stress than adults,
while also lacking the full range of mechanisms that adults have for coping with stress.
1. Children’s Coping Capacity
Psychologists use the term “coping” to refer to individuals’ “constantly changing cognitive and behavioral efforts to manage speciªc external
and/or internal demands that are appraised as taxing or exceeding the

57 In previous writing, I have supported the idea that, under some limited circumstances,
groups should have the right to demand conformity among their members, even if conformity contravenes public policy goals. See Holning Lau, Transcending the Individualist
Paradigm in Sexual Orientation Antidiscrimination Law, 94 Cal. L. Rev. 1271, 1319
(2006); see also Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (holding that the Boy Scouts
of America can require its members to adopt heterosexual norms because the organization’s freedom of expressive association trumps an antidiscrimination law proscribing sexual orientation discrimination).
58 American law has traditionally shielded the “private sphere” of the family from government intervention, save for exceptional circumstances. A discussion regarding the regulation of parents’ assimilation demands requires a lengthy consideration of the pros and
cons of this protection. For background and related criticisms, see Martha Albertson Fineman, What Place for Family Privacy?, 67 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1207 (1999); Frances Olsen, Constitutional Law: Feminist Critiques of the Public/Private Distinction, 10 Const.
Comment. 319 (1993).
59 See infra notes 75, 78–83 and accompanying text.
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resources of the person.”60 In other words, coping refers to people’s efforts to deal with stress.61 When coping is effective, individuals are described as having developed “resilience.”62 The stressors that trigger coping range from daily hassles to catastrophic natural disasters.63 Stress, when
not effectively mitigated, can undermine both psychological and physical
well-being.64
The capacity to cope develops during the course of one’s life and,
therefore, adults are generally equipped with the greatest capacity.65 Although researchers disagree on how to categorize particular coping techniques, there is general agreement that coping techniques emerge throughout
one’s life.66 Infants and young children tend to deal with stress through
purely involuntary means, such as crying.67 As children develop their coping
capacity, they usually develop passive techniques ªrst, ªnding ways to
avoid stress, for example, by withdrawing from stressful social interactions.68 With time, children develop more active forms of coping, such as
thinking about problems, trying to ªnd solutions, and engaging in simple
emotion-stabilizing exercises.69 During adolescence, individuals broaden
their range of coping techniques and learn to employ those techniques more
effectively.70 By adulthood, individuals usually employ an extensive range of
both problem-solving and emotion-stabilizing techniques.71
For the purposes of this Article, it is useful to note that two factors—
a strong sense of self and a supportive social network—contribute to one’s
coping capacity. A strong sense of self empowers individuals to confront
60 Richard S. Lazarus & Susan Folkman, Stress, Appraisal, and Coping 141
(1984); see also Bruce E. Compas, et al., Coping with Stress During Childhood and Adolescence: Problems, Progress, and Potential in Theory and Research, 127 Psychol. Bull.
87, 88 (2001) (describing Lazarus and Folkman’s deªnition as the “most widely cited” in
research on children’s coping).
61 Some psychologists distinguish voluntary efforts from involuntary efforts, such as
crying, and exclude involuntary efforts from their deªnition of coping. See Compas et al.,
supra note 60, at 91.
62 Id. at 89.
63 Dianna T. Kenny, Psychological Foundations of Stress and Coping: A Developmental Perspective, in Stress and Health: Research and Clinical Applications 88–89
(Dianna T. Kenny et al. eds., 2000).
64 Id.
65 See Compas et al., supra note 60, at 91 (“Coping and other stress responses can be
expected to follow a predictable developmental course.”); Kenny, supra note 63, at 82
(“Changes in the ability to cope are linked to major maturational changes throughout the
lifespan.”); Christopher J. Recklitis & Gil G. Noam, Clinical and Developmental Perspectives on Adolescent Coping, 30 Child Psychol. & Hum. Dev. 87, 97 (1999) (studying
adolescent psychiatric patients and conªrming “the developmental nature of coping behaviors”).
66 See Compas et al., supra note 60, at 91.
67 Id. at 90.
68 Id. at 91.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 See Lazarus & Folkman, supra note 60 (describing in detail typologies of coping
techniques).
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stressful situations and reºect on those situations with greater clarity.72
Supportive social networks provide people with interpersonal emotional
support.73 As discussed below, children who face assimilation pressures
often have weakened senses of self; for example, immigrant youth are more
likely than nonimmigrant youth to suffer identity confusion.74 Moreover,
children who face assimilation pressures may need to overcome certain
hurdles before they seek interpersonal support; for example, gay and lesbian
youth must be comfortable enough to identify openly before they can seek
emotional support in coping with sexual orientation-related stress. Thus,
the very nature of assimilation demands makes coping with them particularly difªcult.
2. Children’s Identity Development
It is generally accepted that adolescence is the phase of human development in which people are most preoccupied with identity struggles. 75
Most literature on identity development derives from the work of Erik Erikson. Although scholars have expanded upon Erikson’s work, his basic concepts provide the foundation for understanding identity development.76
Recognizing the legitimacy of his work, the Supreme Court has already
cited him in three opinions.77
According to Erikson, people face particular psychosocial challenges at
various stages of life;78 resolution of these challenges is required for one’s
health and growth.79 The primary psychosocial challenge of adolescence
is to establish a well-developed identity.80 This is not to say that identity
development is conªned to adolescence. People confront questions of identity from early childhood to late adulthood.81 However, it is during ado72 See Jeannie S. Kidwell et al., Adolescent Identity Exploration: A Test of Erikson’s
Theory of Transitional Crisis, 30 Adolescence 785, 789 (1995); Recklitis & Noam, supra
note 65, at 93–96.
73 See Kenny, supra note 63, at 82; Recklitis & Noam, supra note 65, at 97.
74 See infra Part I.B.2. Some minority youth might experience identity confusion because of their minority status even in the absence of demands to assimilate. In these situations, assimilation demands might exacerbate any preexisting identity confusion.
75 See Elizabeth Douvan, Erik Erikson: Critical Times, Critical Theory, 28 Child Psychol. & Hum. Dev. 15, 18 (1997).
76 See generally id.
77 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005) (citing Erikson, Youth and Crisis, supra note 6, in a juvenile death penalty case); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815,
835 n.43 (1988) (citing Erik H. Erikson, Childhood and Society 261–63 (1985) and
Erikson, Youth and Crisis, supra note 6, at 128–35 in a juvenile death penalty case);
United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 78 n.1 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citing Erik H.
Erikson, quoted in Group for the Advancement of Society, Comm. on Psychiatry &
Law, The Right to Abortion: A Psychiatric View 219 (1969), in an abortion case).
78 Erikson referred to these challenges as “normative crises,” i.e., “normal phase[s] of
increased conºict.” Erikson, Life Cycle, supra note 6, at 125.
79 Id. at 51–57.
80 Id. at 94–100; Erikson, Youth and Crisis, supra note 6, at 128–34.
81 See Erikson, Youth and Crisis, supra note 6, at 91–96.
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lescence that people are most preoccupied with the question, “Who am
I?”82 Failure to resolve that question jeopardizes psychological health,
resulting in symptoms ranging from reduced productivity to depression
to difªculty engaging in intimate relationships.83
A well-developed identity, as deªned by Erikson, is “the accrued conªdence that one’s ability to maintain inner sameness and continuity . . . is
matched by the sameness and continuity of one’s meaning for others.”84
That is to say, an individual’s identity is well developed when: (1) she has
achieved a coherent sense of self—that is, an inner sameness—such that
her thoughts and actions are not random but guided by speciªc principles
and values; (2) that sense of self is continuous through time; and (3) the
way she represents herself to others is consistent with that coherent and
continuous sense of self.85 The third requirement of a well-developed identity is particularly important for this Article because individuals who face
assimilation pressures often develop an unhealthy incongruence between
their internal sense of self and their external representations of self.86
Building on Erikson’s works, James Marcia identiªed four statuses
in the process of identity formation: identity diffusion, identity foreclosure,
moratorium, and identity achievement.87 Diffusion is the least-developed
status. When an individual is in a state of identity diffusion, she has neither explored nor committed to any values or goals to shape her notions
of self.88 In the state of foreclosure, an individual has committed to speciªc
values and goals but has committed based on little or no exploration of
alternatives. Often, adolescents in the state of foreclosure have simply
adopted their parents’ goals and values without exploring alternatives.89

82

See id. at 91.
See Erikson, Life Cycle, supra note 6, at 131–46.
84 Id. at 94.
85 See id. at 127; see also Jenny Makros & Marita P. McCabe, Relationships Between
Identity and Self-Representations During Adolescence, 30 J. Youth & Adolescence 623,
625 (2001) (“According to Erikson, the more developed one’s sense of identity is, the more
congruency (or less discrepancy) there should be among one’s various self beliefs.”);
Serena J. Patterson et al., The Inner Space and Beyond: Women and Identity, in Adolescent Identity Formation 9 (Gerald R. Adams et al. eds., 1992) (summarizing Erikson’s
deªnition of identity).
86 See Erikson, Life Cycle, supra note 6, at 120. Following Erikson, E. Tory Higgins
elaborated on the psychological harms of incongruence between an individual’s inner
sense of self and her outward representations of self; Higgins also provided empirical evidence to support his theory. See E. Tory Higgins, Self-Discrepancy: A Theory Relating Self
and Affect, 94 Psychol. Rev. 319 (1987).
87 See James E. Marcia, Development and Validation of Ego Identity Status, 3 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 551 (1966); James E. Marcia, Identity in Adolescence, in
Handbook of Adolescent Psychology 159 (Joseph Adelson ed., 1980); see also Makros &
McCabe, supra note 85, at 624–25 (describing Marcia’s operationalization of Erikson’s
theory as “the most widely respected and researched” and noting that more than three hundred studies have incorporated Marcia’s four statuses); Patterson et al., supra note 85, at
10–12 (summarizing the previous works of Marcia, one of the authors of the piece).
88 Patterson et al., supra note 85, at 9.
89 Id.
83
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Marcia considers foreclosed identities to be underdeveloped, noting that
people often abandon foreclosed identities to explore alternatives.90 Moratorium refers to the state of development in which people actively explore
their identity without committing to any goals or values.91 In the state of
identity achievement, which follows moratorium, individuals establish a
strong identity by committing to a set of life goals and values.92 Although
those goals and values may still evolve over time, they are relatively stable.93
Identity is not synonymous with self-concept, although the two are
often conºated in common parlance. In the tradition of Erikson and Marcia,
identity is speciªcally the part of one’s self-concept that is developed94 by
exploring and committing to particular values and goals associated with
social categories such as religion, political ideology, gender, sexual orientation, race, ethnicity, and so on.95 Thus, a person may be aware that she is
afraid of heights. Being afraid of heights is part of her self-concept, but it
is not a part of her identity because she did not develop an awareness of
those fears by adopting particular values and goals. Society constructs
the social categories that are salient to people’s identities.96 Categories like
race and sexual orientation, for example, are particularly salient because
history and social dynamics make people particularly aware of the allegiances they adopt with regard to those categories.
Note that, even though people may be born with a particular racial
phenotype or a predisposition for same-sex attraction,97 developing a sense
of identity related to those biological traits is still a process—one that
involves learning about, relating to, and committing to, socially constructed
meanings associated with the biological status. For example, people who
report feeling attraction to members of the same sex, and people who report
having engaged in same-sex sexual behavior, do not always report a gay,
lesbian, or bisexual identity.98
90

Id.
Id.
Id.
93 Id.
94 See Marcia, Identity in Adolescence, supra note 87, at 159–60.
95 Erikson’s and Marcia’s research focused on particular social categories: gender, religion, political ideology, and occupational choice. See Marcia, Development and Validation, supra note 87 (summarizing Erikson’s and Marcia’s work). Subsequent researchers
extended Erikson’s and Marcia’s theories to other social categories. See Vivienne Cass,
Homosexual Identity: A Concept in Need of Deªnition, 9 J. Homosexuality 105, 111
(1984).
96 See Johanna E. Bond, International Intersectionality: A Theoretical and Pragmatic
Exploration of Women’s Human Rights, 52 Emory L.J. 71, 102–04 (2003).
97 Whether an individual’s sexual orientation is a product of nature or nurture is still
unclear to scientists; however, mounting evidence suggests that sexual orientation can be
related to genetics. See Brian Mustanski et al., Genomewide Scan of Male Homosexuality,
116 Hum. Genetics 272 (2005).
98 See Edward O. Laumann et al., The Social Organization of Sexuality 287–
301 (1994) (providing empirical data on the percentages of individuals who experience
91
92
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Because the case study in Part IV of this Article focuses on the rights of
gay and lesbian youth, it is worth spending a moment to consider speciªcally the development of sexual orientation as a component of one’s identity.
Developing speciªc components of one’s identity—such as one’s sexual
orientation—comports with Erikson’s and Marcia’s theories.99 Put differently, a key developmental challenge for youth is to achieve a sense of
sexual identity that is coherent and continuous while also consistent with
external representations.100 That challenge is easier for straight youth than
for gay and lesbian youth. Societal pressures have made heterosexuality
the default sexual identity. Thus, youth with an inclination to opposite-sex
intimacy can arrive at a stable heterosexual identity without much exploration of their sexual goals and values.101 For youth with an inclination toward same-sex intimacy, however, achieving a stable sexual identity requires
transgressing the heterosexual default by exploring values such as gay
pride and aspirations for same-sex relationships. Because society generally discourages the exploration and adoption of such values and goals,
gay and lesbian youth face hurdles in forming a strong identity. Weak
identities among gay and lesbian youth contribute to the increased likelihood of poor psychological health, manifesting in both mental and physical symptoms.102 Youth belonging to other stigmatized minority groups
also face difªcult challenges.103
Erikson acknowledged this phenomenon when he observed that “the
increasing demand for standardization, uniformity, and conformity” threatens adolescents’ identity formation.104 Indeed, assimilation demands compel
adolescents to commit outwardly to particular goals and values, without
exploration, even when those goals and values conºict with the adolescents’
inner sense of self. In that regard, assimilation pressures hinder the formation of minority youth identity, burdening them with considerable stress.

homosexual attraction, who have engaged in homosexual behavior, and who self-identify
as homosexual or bisexual).
99 See Mary Jane Rotheram-Borus & Kris A. Langabeer, Developmental Trajectories of
Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Youth, in Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Identities and Youth
97, 99–101 (Anthony R. D’Augelli & Charlotte J. Patterson eds., 2001) (concluding that
development of sexual identity and ethnic identity conform to Erikson’s and Marcia’s theories).
100 See supra notes 84–87 and accompanying text.
101 See Rotheram-Borus & Langabeer, supra note 99, at 101.
102 See Michael Radkowsky & Lawrence Siegel, The Gay Adolescent: Stressors, Adaptations, and Psychosocial Interventions, 17 Clinical Psychol. Rev. 191, 191 (1997) (“Social stigmatization hinders the ability of gay adolescents to achieve the tasks of adolescence. Because their sexual identity is denigrated by society, these youth have difªculty
forming a positive identity.”).
103 See, e.g., Margaret Beale Spencer et al., Ethnicity, Ethnic Identity, and Competence
Formation: Adolescent Transition and Cultural Transformation, 60 J. Negro Educ. 366,
380 (1991) (discussing the psychological health of ethnic and racial minority youth).
104 See Erikson, Life Cycle, supra note 6, at 120.
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3. Compounded Effects of Assimilation
At the very least, assimilation demands impose harms on individuals
who belong to minority groups. The preceding sections suggest that the
harms of assimilation are compounded when assimilation demands are
imposed on children speciªcally. In light of these compounded harms, requiring children to suppress minority group traits in order to ªt into a mainstream is particularly troubling. The following three Parts detail how that
normative claim can and should shape the law.
Before proceeding to legal arguments, however, it is worth noting that
assimilation’s compounded harms on children are not simply theoretical.
Empirical evidence suggests that the compounded harms are alarmingly
real. The evidence takes two forms. First, data show that minority youth
contending with assimilation demands are more likely than other children
to have poor psychological and physical health.105 Second, survey results
show that greater identity achievement among minority youth corresponds
to better psychological and physical health.106
Consider gay and lesbian youth as an example. As discussed in Part
IV, gay and lesbian youth are currently subject to striking assimilation
demands. The majority of gay and lesbian youth cope with their increased
stress and emerge from adolescence as healthy—and often remarkably
resilient—adults.107 Nevertheless, research shows that, compared to youth
generally, a disproportionate number of gay and lesbian youth suffer from
poor psychological and physical health.108 Poor psychological health can
lead to dire consequences. Survey-based studies since 1990 have consistently shown that thirty to forty percent of gay and lesbian youth attempt
suicide.109 That rate far exceeds the estimated three to ªfteen percent attempt rate among all adolescents.110 Gay and lesbian youth are also more
likely to attempt suicide than gay and lesbian adults.111 Although skeptics
criticized the methodology used in early studies for relying on conven105

See infra notes 107–113, 119 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 118–119 and accompanying text.
107 See Ritch C. Savin-Williams, Gay and Lesbian Youth: Expressions of Identity 182–85 (1990) (“[T]he results of the current study presented lesbian and gay adolescents as essentially psychologically and socially healthy individuals.”).
108 See James Lock & Hans Steiner, Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Youth Risks for Emotional, Physical, and Social Problems: Results from a Community-Based Survey, 38 J. Am.
Acad. Child & Adol. Psychol. 297 (1999).
109 See J. Stephen McDaniel et al., The Relationship Between Sexual Orientation and
Risk for Suicide: Research Findings and Future Directions for Research and Prevention,
31 Suicide & Life-Threatening Behav. 84, 87–96 (2001).
110 See id. at 87 (citing Patrick J. Meehan, Attempted Suicide Among Young Adults:
Progress Toward a Meaningful Estimate of Prevalence, 149 Am. J. Psychol. 41 (1992)).
111 See Heidi S. Kulkin et al., Suicide Among Gay and Lesbian Adolescents and Young
Adults: A Review of the Literature, 40 J. Homosexuality 1, 2 (2000) (“Most suicide attempts by gays or lesbians take place during their youth.”); McDaniel et al., supra note
109, at 88 (summarizing two studies of gay and lesbian adults who had attempted suicide,
which showed that most attempts were made before age twenty-ªve).
106
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ience samples,112 four recent studies based on statewide school-population
samples conªrm the ªgures from the earlier studies.113
Meanwhile, survey-based studies reveal what ought to be self-evident:
high self-esteem among gay and lesbian youth is directly related to their
degree of comfort with homosexuality.114 One study directly asked high
school students: “Are you comfortable with your sexual orientation?”115 The
study found that students who were comfortable with their sexual orientation had higher measures of both mental and physical health.116 Straight
students who were comfortable with their sexual orientation were the
healthiest; gay students who were uncomfortable were the least healthy.117
Studies also show that self-esteem is directly related to disclosure of sexual identity, which is a sign of identity achievement.118 This research suggests that the high suicide rate among gay and lesbian youth can be reduced by protecting them from assimilation demands, which breed self112 Early studies recruited subjects from places such as gay and lesbian support groups,
which could have biased the studies’ ªndings. See McDaniel et al., supra note 109, at 87–
90 (discussing the early studies’ methodologies); see also Amy Lovell, Comment, “Other
Students Always Used to Say, ‘Look at the Dykes’”: Protecting Students from Peer Sexual
Orientation Harassment, 86 Cal. L. Rev. 617, 624–25 (1998) (discussing the early studies’ methodological ºaws).
113 Four studies, published between 1998 and 1999, reported the following suicide attempt rates among gay and lesbian students: ªrst study, 35% (high school students); second study, 35% (high school students); third study, 27.5% (high school students); and
fourth study, 28%/21% (male/female, junior high and high school students). See McDaniel
et al., supra note 109, at 91–95 (summarizing ªndings from statewide school-based studies).
One should note that these newer studies still have minor methodological shortcomings. For example, school-based surveys do not account for school dropouts, who may be
more likely to have attempted suicide. See id. at 95. Also, these studies vary in their deªnitions
of suicide attempts and sexual orientation (some surveys asked students to identify their
sexual orientation; others asked students whether they had ever experienced same-sex sexual contact). See id. Finally, three of the studies do not capture how attempt rates may vary
by sex. See id. at 94.
114 See Margaret Rosario et al., The Coming-Out Process and Its Adaptational and
Health-Related Associations Among Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Youths: Stipulation and
Exploration of a Model, 29 Am. J. Community Psychol. 133, 153 (2001).
115 Lock & Steiner, supra note 108, at 299.
116 Id. at 302. Students’ mental health was measured through their reporting of issues
such as depression, suicide, stress, anxiety, family problems, self-harm, temper problems,
life and social dissatisfaction, and loneliness; general health was measured through reporting on factors such as growth, headaches, and chronic diseases. See id. at 299.
117 Id. at 300–02.
118 See, e.g., Savin-Williams, supra note 107, at 128 (ªnding a relationship between
coming out and self-esteem among gay and lesbian youth); Stephanie K. Swann & Christina A. Spivey, The Relationship Between Self-Esteem and Lesbian Identity During Adolescence, 21 Child & Adolescent Soc. Work J. 629, 632 (2004) (summarizing existing
research showing that disclosure of sexual identity, inter alia, is “speciªcally relevant to
lesbian adolescents’ self-esteem”). Although these studies do not conclusively show that
disclosure causes higher self-esteem, they warrant attention. If disclosure does not produce
self-esteem, but self-esteem produces disclosure, one can hypothesize that disclosure is an
important part of maintaining self-esteem. Disclosure is a sign of identity achievement because congruence between one’s inner sense of self and one’s outward representation of
that self is necessary for identity achievement.
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denial and make it more difªcult for gay and lesbian youth to achieve stable
identities.
These ªndings are not unique to the context of sexual orientation. Research on ethnicity consistently shows that adolescents who strongly identify with an ethnic group have greater psychological well-being than their
peers.119 These ªndings suggest that, to avoid jeopardizing the health of
minority youth, the law should be conducive to the identity achievement
of minority adolescents; disfavoring assimilationist laws would contribute to this end.
II. The Pluralism Principle
How should the law protect children from harmful assimilation demands? Most existing legal scholarship on assimilation proposes reforming statutory employment law.120 Because most children are not employed,
those legal proposals are insufªcient.
Rather than focus on employers, I focus on the government as a source
of assimilation demands. Both in the United States and abroad, assimilation demands on children often come directly from the state, especially
from public schools. For example, when the French government banned
girls from wearing headscarves to school, it demanded that Muslim girls
assimilate by muting their religious identity.121 Similarly, when the grooming codes at American schools have the effect of banning Native American hairstyles, they require Native American youth to downplay their ethnic
identity.122
Pluralism is the antidote to assimilation demands. Thus, as stated at
the beginning of this Article, I propose a two-pronged pluralism principle
for children’s rights jurisprudence. According to the ªrst prong, socialization of children is generally acceptable, but the government must avoid
socialization policies that undermine children’s ability to develop and ex119 See Eunai K. Shrake & Siyon Rhee, Ethnic Identity as a Predictor of Problem Behaviors Among Korean American Adolescents, 39 Adolescence 601, 602–03 (2004) (concluding that achievement of an ethnic identity corresponds with “self-esteem and psychological well-being as measured in self-worth, sense of mastery, purpose in life, and social
competence,” while “feelings of role confusion and alienation resulting from ethnic identity conºicts can lead to psychological as well as behavioral problems for ethnic minority
adolescents”); see also Joseph D. Hovey & Cheryl A. King, Acculturative Stress, Depression, and Suicidal Ideation among Immigrant and Second-Generation Latino Adolescents,
35 J. Am. Acad. Child & Adolescent Psych. 1183, 1188–90 (1990) (presenting evidence
that ªrst- and second-generation Latino adolescents in the United States are more likely to
experience depression and suicidal ideation than adolescents generally, and that this likelihood correlates with the amount of acculturation stress reported by the adolescents).
120 See, e.g., Bartlett, supra note 4; Caldwell, supra note 37; Carbado & Gulati, Working Identity, supra note 4; Perea, supra note 51; Rich, supra note 29.
121 See supra note 12.
122 See New Rider v. Bd. of Educ., 480 F.2d 693 (10th Cir. 1973) (rejecting a First
Amendment challenge to a school grooming code with a hair-length requirement that prohibited Pawnee students from wearing traditional Native American hairstyles).
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press their identities. This requirement creates a presumption against statesanctioned assimilation demands. According to the second prong, the government can rebut the presumption by showing that protecting a child’s
exercise of identity interests would generate cognizable harms to the child
herself or to others. I offer a narrow deªnition of cognizable harms below.
In the remainder of this Part, I ªrst clarify the pluralism principle by
comparing and contrasting it with some other commentators’ proposals
regarding children’s rights. I then deªne in more detail each of the principle’s prongs.
A. The Principle’s Liberatory Function
Before proceeding, I should clarify that the pluralism principle is not
synonymous with a positive right to identity development. Instead, the principle is a normative proposition that guides determinations regarding
whether to afford negative liberties to children.123
Indeed, the impetus for the pluralism principle is to protect children
from the state’s assimilation demands. Accordingly, the principle suggests
that children should have the right to demand that the government refrain
from policies that undermine their identity interests, such as bans on headscarves and Native American hairstyles. However, the principle does not
obligate the government to take positive actions to facilitate identity development, such as institutionalizing events on Islamic awareness or Native American pride.
The pluralism principle is a starting point. I acknowledge that the
principle’s negative liberties are necessary but probably insufªcient to protect children’s identity development fully. Perhaps children ought to have
a positive right to particular types of education that foster identity development.124 Perhaps children ought to have a positive right to government
intervention when parents’ assimilation demands become unbearable.125 I
bracket these issues regarding potential positive rights for a future article;
they warrant additional consideration because deªning and enforcing positive rights pose unique challenges.126 In the meantime, this Article focuses
on children’s freedom from governmental assimilation demands.
123 Negative rights entail freedom from government interference, whereas positive rights
entail government assistance in actualizing the decisions that one freely makes. On the
difference between negative and positive rights, see generally Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty (1958).
124 For an argument in favor of children’s positive rights, see Tamar Ezer, A Positive
Right to Protection for Children, 7 Yale Hum. Rts. & Dev. L.J. 1 (2004).
125 See supra note 58.
126 On the difªculty of deªning and enforcing positive rights, see Frank B. Cross, The
Error of Positive Rights, 48 UCLA L. Rev. 857 (2001). For counterarguments, see Stephen
Holmes & Cass R. Sunstein, The Cost of Rights: Why Liberty Depends on Taxes
(1999); Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 2271 (1990).
State governments already afford some positive rights to children, such as rights to education and shelter. See Teitelbaum, supra note 20, at 804–06.
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Existing theories of children’s rights are often either liberationist or
protectionist.127 In contrast, the pluralism principle is a hybrid; while it is
liberatory in practice, its normative underpinnings are protectionist in
nature. Drawing from psychological literature, the principle embodies the
idea that liberation can be a form of protection. By allowing children to
explore and express identity-forming values freely, the principle protects
children from the harms of incomplete identity development. By giving
children the liberty required for identity moratorium and identity achievement, the principle protects children from psychological harm.
The pluralism principle diverges from traditional liberal theory. Early
liberal theorists such as John Stuart Mill explicitly denied negative liberties to children. Mill argued that children lacked the competency required
for autonomous decisionmaking and, therefore, that granting children
freedom would harm them.128 Child liberationists often challenge the assumption that children lack competency. Some advocates have argued that
children should be presumed competent unless proven otherwise.129 Other
commentators have since criticized those proposals for being unworkable
because it is difªcult to deªne and measure competence and because people
develop competency at different rates.130
I eschew the traditional liberal emphasis on competency as a requisite for exercises of liberty.131 Mill and contemporary opponents to chil127 Child liberationists argue for increasing children’s autonomy rights. The original
child liberationists from the 1970s compared children to other oppressed classes, such as
women and racial minorities. For examples of liberationist literature, see John Holt, Escape from Childhood (1974); John Holt, Why Not a Bill of Rights for Children?, in The
Children’s Rights Movement: Overcoming the Oppression of Young People 319
(1977); Rodham, supra note 9. Protectionists argue not for children’s autonomy rights but
for welfare rights that protect children from harm, such as rights to nutrition and shelter.
See Bruce C. Hafen, Children’s Liberation and the New Egalitarianism: Some Reservations About Abandoning Youth to Their “Rights,” 1976 BYU L. Rev. 605, 644–50 (1976)
(arguing for child protectionism and against child liberation); Teitelbaum, supra note 20, at
804–06 (discussing children’s welfare rights).
128 In discussing liberty, Mill remarked: “We are not speaking of children . . . . Those
who are still in a state to require being taken care of by others, must be protected against
their own actions as well as against external injury.” Mill, supra note 18, at 14.
129 See, e.g., Robert Batey, The Rights of Adolescents, 23 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 363,
373 (1982) (arguing that “in a situation in which the state would defer to the desires of an
adult, the state can refuse to defer to the considered desires of an adolescent only upon a
showing that the adolescent is not competent to make the decision”); Rodham, supra note
9, at 508 (arguing to “abolish the status of minority and to reverse its underlying presumption of children’s incompetency”).
130 See, e.g., Martha Minow, Rights for the Next Generation: A Feminist Approach to
Children’s Rights, 9 Harv. Women’s L.J. 1, 5 (1986) (arguing that “there are [no] knowable boundaries between competence and incompetence for any given societal task” and
that “[t]here are no uncontroversial principles to pinpoint the kinds of competencies crucial
to accord an individual independent decision-making power and to relinquish paternalist
control”).
131 See Katherine Hunt Federle, On the Road to Reconceiving Rights for Children: A
Postfeminist Analysis of the Capacity Principle, 42 DePaul L. Rev. 983, 985 (1993) (“It
is my contention not only that competency is unnecessary to any formulation of rights for
children, but also that it is extremely conªning to rights theory in ways that make it difªcult to

338

Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review

[Vol. 42

dren’s autonomy rights claim that the competency requirement protects
children from the potentially harmful consequences of their own decisions.132 However, as illustrated in the previous Part, autonomous exploration and expression of identity is not intrinsically harmful; rather, it is a
requirement for healthy psychological development. Accordingly, the pluralism principle presumes that children’s freedom to exercise identity interests should be protected, unless the state satisªes a showing of harm.133
Unlike many existing liberal arguments for children’s rights, the pluralism principle hinges on a harm-based inquiry instead of a competency-based
inquiry. Competency is a second-order question that only matters if the
state ªrst shows harm.
The principle’s harm-based approach to children’s rights is inspired
by the writings of Emily Buss, who has asserted that, in deciding what
autonomy rights to extend to children, the government should consider how
extending such rights would foster or harm child development.134 The pluralism principle builds on that idea by establishing a legal presumption that
fosters identity-related aspects of child development and by narrowly deªning the types of harms that would counter that presumption.
B. Protecting Identity Interests
The pluralism principle’s ªrst prong protects children’s exercise of
identity interests: the development and expression of identity. Protecting
children’s identity development means protecting children’s ability to attain
moratorium and achievement statuses. In other words, it means protecting children’s ability to develop a sense of self by exploring and committing to goals and values associated with different social categories.135 Proconceptualize, much less acknowledge, the rights of children and other groups.”); Melinda
A. Roberts, Parent and Child in Conºict: Between Liberty and Responsibility, 10 Notre
Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol’y 485, 514–15 (1996) (arguing that “children [should] have
a right of liberty . . . only in those particular circumstances in which the child’s choice in
fact serves his or her own best interests”).
132 See Mill, supra note 18, at 14; Hafen supra note 127, at 650.
133 Note that the pluralism principle protects children qua children. In contrast, some
commentators have argued that children should have some freedoms because they are potential adults; the idea is that giving children some autonomy prepares children for the decisions that they will face as adults. See Sharon Bishop, Children, Autonomy and the Right to
Self-Determination, in Whose Child? 174 (William Aiken & Hugh LaFollette eds., 1980).
I reject merely viewing children as potential adults because such a view ignores the fact
that, when children are denied certain liberties, they suffer immediate harms as children.
See Minow, Children’s Rights, supra note 20, at 296 n.160.
134 See Buss, Allocating Developmental Control, supra note 17, at 35.
135 See supra notes 87–92 and accompanying text. Because the pluralism principle protects exploration of ºuid goals and values, it rejects the notion that people belong in rigid,
ªxed identity categories. For example, an American of Asian descent can explore and
choose to adopt goals and values that she may or may not label as “Asian American.” Indeed, the pluralism principle protects, for example, the individual of Asian descent who
identiªes, in the psychological sense, with goals and values typically associated with people of another racial phenotype. There is no correct way to be Asian American, and an individ-
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tecting children’s identity expression means protecting children’s ability
to make outward representations of that internal sense of self.136
Often particular conduct constitutes a prima facie exercise of identity
interests: for example, wearing a shirt that reads “gay and proud,” wearing a
yarmulke, or joining the Young Republicans of America. These exercises
should be protected. Surely, whether conduct constitutes an exercise of
identity interests will not always be clear. However, the difªcult cases neither detract from the principle’s normative weight nor render the relatively
easy cases any less worthy of legal protection.137
An opponent of the pluralism principle might worry that protecting
identity interests would create a slippery slope. For example, some might
argue that shy people constitute an identity group. Under the principle,
would a shy student have a claim against a teacher who requires her students to study public speaking? Below I explain why such worry about slippery slopes is unwarranted. Personality traits, such as shyness, can be
distinguished from identities, such as racial, religious, and sexual identities.138
As explained above, individuals develop identities through a process
of exploring and committing to goals and values associated with particular social categories.139 For example, even if someone is born to black parents, she only develops a sense of black identity through a process of
learning and adopting goals and values associated with the black community.140 Similarly, there are shared goals and values within the Jewish
community, the gay and lesbian community, and other identity groups,
that an individual may adopt or reject as a part of her identiªcation process. In contrast, one does not develop a “shy identity” by committing to
values and goals associated with shy people. The pluralism principle focuses on the suppression of identities because of the particularly harmful
effects of that process.141
This Article does not articulate a comprehensive list of social categories that are worth discussing. Not all social categories are equally relevant
to a person’s sense of self. In this Article, I focus on the categories of
race, ethnicity, religion, political opinion, disability, sexual orientation, and
ual with an Asian phenotype may identify, for example, with black identity. See Angela
Onwuachi-Willig & Mario L. Barnes, By Any Other Name?: On Being “Regarded as”
Black, and Why Title VII Should Apply Even if Lakisha and Jamal Are White, 2005 Wis. L.
Rev. 1283 (arguing that Title VII should prohibit discrimination against people who are
not phenotypically black but identify with, or are regarded by others as, being black).
136 See supra notes 84–86 and accompanying text.
137 Compare the exercise of identity interests to the exercise of religion. Whether particular conduct constitutes an exercise of religion has often vexed courts. However, those
difªcult cases do not suggest that the Free Exercise Clause should be amended out of the
Bill of Rights.
138 See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
139 See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
140 See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
141 See supra Part I.B (discussing harms).

340

Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review

[Vol. 42

gender identity, because those categories are particularly relevant to a
person’s sense of self. These categories are not relevant by nature. They
are relevant because, historically, social prejudice based on these statuses
has been pervasive, rendering these statuses socially salient. Perhaps one
day society truly will be colorblind.142 Or perhaps one day an individual’s
choice of intimate partner will be no more socially salient than her choice of
a favorite ice cream ºavor. Until that day arrives, however, people will
continue to be particularly self-aware of their identities based on the aforementioned categories.143 Accordingly, attacking someone’s identity with
regard to these categories is particularly injurious and worthy of censure.
C. Exceptional Cases: Preventing Cognizable Harms
Although the ªrst prong of the pluralism principle presumes that all
identities deserve protection, the government can rebut that presumption
and legitimately impose assimilation demands if it shows that by doing
so it prevents harms. For example, the government can prohibit children’s
exercise of Neo-Nazi identity if it shows that the conduct is sufªciently
violent or hateful to constitute a cognizable harm. Below, I clarify the categories of cognizable harm that the government can invoke to rebut the principle’s presumption against assimilation demands.
In developing and expressing her identity, a child will sometimes
impose harms on herself or on others. Those harms legitimize government
infringement of that child’s identity interests. However, only a narrow scope
of harms should be cognizable under law.
1. Binding Commitments as Harms to Self
What constitutes a cognizable harm to a child’s self? The state must
exercise restraint in construing such harm. Because the pluralism principle is meant to protect difference, the state must not make subjective
judgments about whether any particular exercise of identity is culturally
or morally desirable. Thus, for example, the government should not limit
a young girl’s access to genital mutilation practitioners simply because
the government views the practice as lacking legitimate cultural purposes.
However, the government may limit that access because, by agreeing to
genital mutilation, a young girl commits to a decision that is difªcult to
142 Of course, whether colorblindness is desirable in the ªrst place is disputed. See
Charles R. Lawrence III, The Epidemiology of Color-Blindness: Learning To Think and
Talk about Race, Again, 15 B.C. Third World L.J. 1 (1995).
143 Cf. Charles Stangor et al., Categorization of Individuals on the Basis of Multiple
Social Features, 62 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 207, 208 (1992) (“[S]ocial categories are well learned . . . . [B]ecause they are [perceived to be] highly informative about
underlying dispositions, social categories such as race and sex may be used so frequently
in social perception that their use becomes habitual and automatic, occurring without conscious thought or effort.”).
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undo.144 The state invokes a cognizable harm when it shows that, by exercising her identity, a child is making a binding commitment—either in a
physical sense or a legal sense.
Children are less capable of fully assessing relevant factors before
making decisions.145 Accordingly, there is good reason to preserve a child’s
ability to change her mind on important decisions.146 This logic has been
incorporated, for example, into contract law. Contract law generally protects children from their own commitments by rendering contracts unenforceable when they involve child signatories.147 By the same rationale,
the government may justiªably restrict children’s exercises of identity that
bind them to consequences that are difªcult to undo. For children, such
self-binding amounts to a cognizable harm.
Generally speaking, binding commitments fall into two categories:
decisions of a legal nature, such as marriage, and conduct with bodily consequences.148 Conduct with bodily consequences, such as genital mutilation, involves binding commitments because changes to one’s body are
often difªcult to undo. As James Marcia has pointed out, exploring and
“committing” to social values and goals is an important part of adolescent identity development.149 When Marcia spoke of commitment, however, he did not mean commitment in any binding sense. There is directional freedom in moving between competing values associated with social categories—for example, liberal and conservative, masculine and
feminine, heteronormative and queer, Christian and Buddhist. Although
one may feel committed to certain values, such intangible allegiance is not
binding in the same way as legal or bodily consequences, and individuals
are free to return to their starting positions.
Thus exercising identity interests usually does not require making
binding commitments. For example, wearing a yarmulke does not preclude
someone from converting to another religion. Similarly, protesting a war
144 My argument here is normative rather than descriptive. As a descriptive matter, subjective cultural factors probably play a signiªcant role in the promulgation of laws regulating female genital mutilation.
145 See Emily Buss, Constitutional Fidelity Through Children’s Rights, 2004 Sup. Ct.
Rev. 355, 358–59 [hereinafter Buss, Constitutional Fidelity].
146 See Buss, Allocating Developmental Control, supra note 17, at 41 (“[T]he ongoing
process of identity development, which continues through adolescence, compromises the
extent to which it is appropriate to bind an individual at Time 2 to the choices made by that
individual, as a child, at Time 1.”).
147 See Martin R. Gardner & Anne Profªtt Dupre, Children and the Law
410–17 (2002).
148 Similarly, age-of-consent laws regulating sexual intimacy are justiªed even if they
assimilate adolescents to majoritarian moral codes. Consent to sex has a legal nature. By
consenting to the act of sexual intimacy, one essentially agrees to waive certain rights, such
as the right to press charges for rape.
149 See Franklin E. Zimring, Changing Legal World of Adolescence 65–72
(1982) (arguing that adolescence should be viewed as something like a driver’s permit for
adulthood, during which individuals experiment with different values); supra notes 87–93
and accompanying text.
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does not bind someone to an antiwar position. Holding hands with a samesex partner also does not bind someone to being gay.
Insofar as the pluralism principle’s second prong is concerned, binding commitments are the only cognizable harm to oneself. A respect for difference prohibits the government from making subjective determinations
about whether a particular exercise of identity is culturally or morally desirable, but the state can make a more objective determination that an exercise of identity interests has enduring consequences. Thus, the state can
require greater maturity from individuals who engage in such behavior.150
2. Harms to Others
The state also has a legitimate interest in limiting a child’s exercise
of identity if that exercise harms others. This limitation is a partial incorporation of John Stuart Mill’s harm principle into the pluralism principle.151 Because the purpose of the pluralism principle is to protect children from assimilation demands, the state cannot assert that the community is harmed simply because children’s exercises of identity interests
offend the community’s majoritarian sensibilities. Changes in community
norms are not intrinsically harmful. As H. L. A. Hart persuasively argued,
there is no empirical support for the claim that deviation from community
mores—in and of itself—harms the community, unless the term “harm” is
conºated with “change.”152
Accordingly, I offer a narrow deªnition of cognizable harms to others. These include (1) incitement of other children to harm themselves153
150 The pluralism principle merely gives the government discretion to infringe upon
identity interests when long-term consequences are at stake. The state is not obligated to
regulate children’s actions whenever those actions lead to long-term consequences. For example, lawmakers may very well determine that some actions—such as ear piercing—have
relatively inconsequential long-term effects that do not warrant regulation.
151 See Mill, supra note 18, at 165 (“[T]he only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent
harm to others.”). I discuss, in notes 131–133 and accompanying text, supra, why I reject
Mill’s wholesale exclusion of children. Mill argued that harm to others is the only
justiªcation for limiting adults’ freedom. See Mill, supra note 18, at 165. Because I am
writing about children, my claim is much more modest. The pluralism principle’s ªrst prong
states that the government may limit children’s freedom for socialization purposes, except
when the freedom at stake implicates identity interests. Not all conduct involves identity
interests. Since the state may limit a child’s exercise of identity when that exercise harms
the child herself, the pluralism principle protects signiªcantly fewer freedoms than Mill’s
broader harm principle.
152 See H. L. A. Hart, Law, Liberty and Morality 49–51 (1963). According to Hart,
the notion that changes in morality are inherently harmful is “entitled to no more respect
than the Emperor Justinian’s statement that homosexuality was the cause of earthquakes.”
Id. at 50.
153 In other words, the state may intervene when children incite other children to make
binding commitments of either a legal or bodily nature, as discussed in Part II.B.1, supra.
Typically, states will exercise this power in school contexts. Thus, for example, even if a
student believes strongly in the legalization and consumption of certain drugs—whether
for religious, cultural, or political reasons—a school may be permitted to prevent that stu-

2007]

Pluralism: A Principle for Children’s Rights

343

and (2) harms to others’ protected interests—such as privacy, physical
well-being, and property interests.154
Regarding the question of harm, two particular situations are uniquely
complex and warrant further discussion: when a child’s exercise of identity interests challenges her parents’ desires, and when her exercise of
identity interests compromises other children’s identity interests.
a. Parents’ Childrearing Interests
Can the state’s allowance of a child’s exercise of identity interests
harm her parents by infringing their protected interest in childrearing?
For example, consider a child who wants to explore Buddhism by borrowing
books on Buddhism from the school library, even though her devout Christian parents object to her interest. Should the school limit the child’s identity
exploration in order to protect her parent’s childrearing interests?
As long as the government protects children’s exercise of identity interest through negative liberties, parents’ childrearing interests generally
are not infringed. The Supreme Court has held that the Constitution protects parents’ rights to direct the upbringing of their children, especially
with regard to religion,155 but that protection is limited.156 The Constitution protects parents’ rights to remove their children from public schools
dent from openly preaching drug use to her classmates because drug use entails bodily
consequences and a legal decision, i.e., to break the law. However, the school may only
intervene if the student’s classmates are vulnerable to peer pressure, which will depend on
their maturity. As this Article goes to publication, the Supreme Court is poised to release
its decision in Frederick v. Morse, a case in which a high school principal punished students for displaying a banner stating, “Bong Hits 4 Jesus.” 439 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2006),
cert. granted, 127 S.Ct. 722 (U.S. Dec. 1, 2006). Under the pluralism principle, the principal’s actions only would be justiªed, as a normative matter, if she could show that the banner was likely to incite drug use, and not just parody the school’s position against drugs.
154 See Feinberg, supra note 18, at 38–62, 105–06 (1984) (clarifying Mill’s principle
by deªning harms in terms of setbacks to others’ protected interests).
155 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (holding that Amish parents’ free
exercise right to direct children’s religious upbringing outweighed state interests in mandating schooling for children until the age of sixteen); Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S.
284 (1927) (invalidating state regulations of private schools because the regulations violated parents’ substantive due process right to direct their children’s education); Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (holding that the Due Process Clause protects parents’ right to send their children to private religious schools in lieu of public schools);
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (holding that Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause protects parents’ right to employ a private school teacher to instruct their children
in foreign languages). For a thorough criticism of these cases and the notion of parents’
rights, see James G. Dwyer, Parents’ Religion and Children’s Welfare: Debunking the Doctrine of Parents’ Rights, 82 Cal. L. Rev. 1371 (1994); see also Emily Buss, The Adolescent’s Stake in the Allocation of Educational Control Between Parent and State, 67 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 1233, 1276–88 (2000) (relying on Eriksonian psychological literature to question
the appropriateness of home schooling and private religious schooling for older adolescents).
156 See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (explaining, in a case involving child labor laws, that parents’ interest in directing children’s religious upbringing
is not absolute); infra note 159 and accompanying text.
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and educate their children through private institutions or home schooling.157 However, parents do not have a protected interest in having the state
take steps to facilitate their childrearing.158 Therefore, “preventing harm
to parents” does not implicate the pluralism principle’s second prong.
Protecting parents’ rights, for example, does not require public schools to
alter their curricular requirements, textbooks, or school activities just to
further parents’ childrearing goals. Indeed, parents have argued that their
childrearing interests were infringed when schools’ sex education and condom distribution policies conºicted with their childrearing goals, and these
arguments have generally failed in court.159
b. Other Children’s Identity Interests
Can the state, by protecting a child’s identity interests, set back other
children’s identity interests? Indeed, in cases of hate speech, a child speaker
might harm another child’s identity development in the process of expressing her own identity. I argue the state can legitimately impose assimilation demands in public schools when doing so prevents the harms caused
by hate speech.160
The pluralism principle’s second prong only gives a public school the
discretion to restrict a child speaker’s negative liberties when it considers
her expression to be hate speech.161 The principle does not grant children
a free-standing positive right to hate speech intervention. Pinpointing a
precise deªnition of hate speech is difªcult, and thus enforcing a positive
right to protection from hate speech would be difªcult. However, granting
schools a degree of discretion is not novel. Current law already grants public
schools broad discretion to foresee and preempt other harms, such as stu157

See supra note 155.
In cases where a child’s conduct implicates cognizable harms, the state may consider parental interests to determine whether and how to limit the child’s freedom; however, the state must ªrst show a cognizable harm independent of so-called “harm to parents.” See infra Part III.B.2 (discussing deference to parents in cases such as abortion cases,
which potentially involve cognizable harms because of abortion’s long-term consequences).
159 See, e.g., Leebaert v. Harrington, 332 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that a father
did not have a constitutional right to excuse his son from mandatory sex education
classes); Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Prod., Inc., 68 F.3d 525 (1st Cir. 1995) (determining
that parents’ right to childrearing did not include the right to limit ºow of information in
public school); Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987)
(rejecting parents’ free exercise challenge to textbooks).
160 I am only making a normative argument at this point. The Supreme Court has yet to
decide a case regarding hate speech in the school context. Lower courts have reached
conºicting opinions. I evaluate these conºicting opinions in Part IV.B, infra.
161 The pluralism principle only justiªes the regulation of hate speech in contexts involving child speakers and child audiences; regulating child speakers—but not adult
speakers—makes sense as a legal matter because children have always possessed less freedom of expression than adults. See infra Part IV.B. Protecting child audiences makes sense
because of children’s particular vulnerabilities. See supra Part I.B; see also Richard
Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Understanding Words That Wound 93–109 (2004) (discussing hate speech and the special case of children).
158
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dents’ infringements upon other students’ privacy interests and physical
safety.162 The pluralism principle simply puts identity interests on par with
these other protected interests because, as discussed in Part I, infringement
of identity interests can seriously undermine children’s psychological and
physical health.
Although the state has discretion to regulate hate speech among students, there are minimum requirements for expression to be deemed hate
speech. A gay teenager might associate Christian fundamentalism with
homophobia, and thus be offended by even the slightest expression of Christian fundamentalism, but the state should not suppress all such expression.
Expressions of Christian fundamentalist pride do not necessarily harm gays
and lesbians. To constitute the type of hate speech that is a cognizable harm,
the fundamentalist’s speech must directly attack other children, suggesting that they are to be despised and denied respect because of their identity.163 Such hateful speech is an assimilation demand that undermines identity development. Hate speech is an assimilation demand because it essentially suggests that members of the targeted group need to abandon or
suppress their identity as much as possible, or leave the community because their identity is despised and unworthy of respect.164
The state may err on the cautious side, opting to intervene rarely.
Some forms of expression, however, present easy cases. When a child wears
a shirt declaring “Islam: Rotten to the Core”165 or “God Hates Fags,”166 the
speech seems to say rather clearly that members of certain identity groups
should be despised and denied respect.
Most debates on social issues need not devolve into hate speech. For
example, classroom debates over whether homosexuality is immutable or
whether same-sex marriage should be banned, while controversial, should
generally be acceptable under the pluralism principle’s second prong because they do not inherently suggest that gays and lesbians should be despised and denied respect. Indeed, the same-sex marriage debate largely

162 See infra note 262 and accompanying text (on privacy); infra notes 249–250 accompanying text (on physical safety).
163 This deªnition of hate speech draws from Canadian jurisprudence. See R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, 777 (Can.) (“[H]atred[,] . . . if exercised against members of an
identiªable group, implies that those individuals are to be despised, scorned, denied respect and made subject to ill-treatment on the basis of group afªliation.”).
164 Hate speech can be distinguished from assimilation pressures that merely encourage
people to change. For example, when a school encourages students to be patriotic by conducting ºag salutes, it still respects unpatriotic students who choose not to participate in
the salute. See infra notes 182–187 and accompanying text. In contrast, hate speech is by
deªnition a denial of respect.
165 For an online vendor selling T-shirts with this slogan, see Café Press, http://www.cafe
press.com/religion_01 (last visited Mar. 9, 2007).
166 For a photograph of children wearing T-shirts stating “GOD HATES FAGS.COM,”
see Vox Hunt: Sign O’ The Times GOD HATES FAGS!, http://dancingbear.vox.com/library/
post/vox-hunt-sign-o-the-times-god-hates-fags.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2007).
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has been over whether the government has other interests, aside from hate,
that legitimize same-sex marriage bans.167
In contrast, schools should have the discretion to decide that debates
over whether particular identity groups should be hated have no place on
school grounds (even if the debate creates no physical disturbances) because arguments on one side of the debate will amount to hate speech. Children should not be expected to protect themselves against hate speech because they are particularly vulnerable to the crippling effects of assimilation demands, including hate speech. A child who is attacked in this way
is not empowered to respond with defensive speech.
III. Uncovering the Pluralism Principle in Existing Law
In the remainder of this Article, I focus on how the pluralism principle relates to constitutional law. Although courts have never clearly articulated the pluralism principle, it seems already to inºuence the Supreme
Court’s decisions in cases involving children’s constitutional rights. Different cases have implicitly embraced different parts of the pluralism principle. My goal is to uncover and piece together the pluralism principle, which
has been emerging in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on children’s
rights.
The pluralism principle has been manifested as both a shield and a
sword. In some cases, children have successfully raised the principle as a
shield, preventing the government from limiting their rights in relation to
those of adults; I refer to these cases as regarding equal rights to those of
adults. In at least one other case, the pluralism principle has been wielded as
a sword to justify affording children more negative liberty than adults. I
refer to such cases as regarding special rights.168
In this Part, I ªrst provide background on constitutional principles
that are not explicitly stated in the Constitution’s text. I then show how the
pluralism principle has begun to inform the Court’s decisions—ªrst in
cases regarding children’s equal rights and then in cases regarding children’s special rights.
A. Constitutional Principles Generally
Legal principles, which ªll lacunae within the Constitution’s text, have
a history of guiding judicial decisionmaking, including that of the Supreme
167 See, e.g., Andersen v. King, 138 P.3d 963, 980–81 (Wash. 2006) (disagreeing with
plaintiffs that Washington’s same-sex marriage ban was motivated only by antigay animus);
Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 8 (N.Y. 2006) (reaching the same conclusion regarding
New York’s same-sex marriage ban).
168 I borrow the term “special rights” from Buss, who has written extensively on how
Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979), suggests that children have not only equal constitutional rights but special constitutional rights. See Buss, Allocating Developmental Control,
supra note 17, at 47; Buss, Constitutional Fidelity, supra note 145, at 356.
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Court.169 Some principles guide constitutional decisionmaking generally,
as opposed to decisionmaking concerning one particular constitutional provision. For example, the principle of constitutional avoidance guides constitutional decisionmaking generally, dictating that the Court will construe
statutes so that they do not infringe the Constitution.170 Recently, constitutional law scholars have argued that an equality principle guides the
Court’s decisionmaking not only in equal protection cases, but also in substantive due process and First Amendment cases.171
Just as equality can be articulated as a principle that guides constitutional decisionmaking generally, the pluralism principle for children’s
rights should also guide decisionmaking in a range of cases—from First
Amendment, to due process, to equal protection cases.172 As discussed below, the pluralism principle and its expansive reach are both grounded in
existing Supreme Court jurisprudence.
Nowhere in its text does the Constitution specify how constitutional
rights affect children. The Court has been ªlling in that gap through case
law, and the pluralism principle has been emerging from that case law.173
B. The Principle and Children’s Equal Rights
Children’s identity interests are implicated in various constitutional
contexts. Freedom of expression and free religious exercise both foster children’s abilities to develop and express their religious identities, including
religious identity speciªcally. Minority children’s identity interests are implicated when the government invokes majoritarian community standards
to restrict liberties that minority children value, such as the liberty to speak a
foreign language. Unequal treatment not only deprives some children of a
good, but also stigmatizes the disadvantaged group, undermining the iden169 See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 710 (2005) (acknowledging a neutrality
principle in Establishment Clause cases); Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 20 (2003)
(describing the proportionality principle of the Eighth Amendment).
170 See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 286 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting
in part) (invoking the principle of constitutional avoidance in a question of procedural due
process); Spector Motor Serv. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105 (1944) (applying the
principle of constitutional avoidance to a question about the Commerce Clause).
171 See, e.g., Noah Feldman, From Liberty to Equality: The Transformation of the Establishment Clause, 90 Cal. L. Rev. 673 (2002) (discussing equality as a principle in Establishment Clause cases); Nan D. Hunter, Living with Lawrence, 88 Minn. L. Rev. 1103
(2004) (discussing equality as a principle in substantive due process cases).
172 Similarly, when Ken Karst wrote his seminal essay on intimate association, he argued that the freedom of intimate association is an organizing principle that should guide
decisionmaking in the areas of substantive due process, the First Amendment, and equal protection. See Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 Yale L.J. 624
(1980).
173 Constitutional principles often emerge—like the common law does—through a pattern among cases, rather than manifesting in a speciªc opinion. See Laurence H. Tribe,
Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 Harv.
L. Rev. 1893, 1899 (2004) (comparing the Court’s reasoning in Lawrence to deriving a
regression line from a scatter diagram of previous substantive due process cases).
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tity development of its members. Accordingly, the legal analysis that follows focuses on cases regarding freedom of expression, free religious
exercise, substantive due process, and equal protection.174
In In re Gault, the Supreme Court famously declared that “neither the
Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone.”175 However, the Court subsequently asserted, in Bellotti v. Baird, that “three reasons justify[ ] the conclusion that the constitutional rights of children
cannot be equated with those of adults: the peculiar vulnerability of children; their inability to make critical decisions in an informed, mature
manner; and the importance of the parental role in child rearing.”176 Although the Court has identiªed these three factors, it has not clariªed how
these factors interact. As a result, critics charge that the Supreme Court’s
children’s rights jurisprudence lacks coherence.177 The pluralism principle reveals previously unrecognized coherence in that jurisprudence.
Assessing vulnerability is the ªrst-order task, and that is when the pluralism principle comes into play. When the state argues that children’s
rights should be more limited than those of adults, it typically begins by
asserting that children are vulnerable to speciªc harms and that rights reduction is a form of protection. When the Court ªnds that states have not identiªed cognizable harms to which children are vulnerable, the Court extends
equal rights to the child.178 Only when the state has identiªed a cognizable harm does the Court engage in signiªcant analyses regarding the two
other Bellotti factors: maturity and deference to parents.179
In the Court’s assessment of vulnerability, it has implicitly raised the
pluralism principle to defend children’s freedom to exercise identity interests from governmental socialization policies. In cases where children’s
ability to develop and express their identities has been at stake, the Court
has repeatedly stated that children are not vulnerable to harm just because
174 Although there are many free exercise cases that involve children, I only address W.
Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). I do not devote more attention to
free exercise cases because the Court generally assumes that children and adults have equal
rights to free exercise. See Note, Children as Believers: Minors’ Free Exercise Rights and
the Psychology of Religious Development, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 2205, 2209 (2002).
175 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967).
176 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979) (upholding an abortion law’s parental notiªcation requirement because it included a satisfactory judicial bypass mechanism).
177 See supra note 20 (listing criticisms of children’s rights jurisprudence).
178 See infra Part III.B.1 (discussing cases in which the state failed to identify cognizable harms).
179 In Bellotti, the Court recognized that it only concerns itself with the maturity factor
when children are demanding rights to make “choices with potentially serious consequences,”
“choices that could be detrimental to them,” or choices that “present[ ] a danger against
which they should be guarded.” 443 U.S. at 635–36. The Court was less clear on when the
deference-to-parent factor comes into play, but it did state that “[u]nder the Constitution,
the State can ‘properly conclude that parents . . . who have [the] primary responsibility for
children’s well-being are entitled to the support of laws designed to aid discharge of that
responsibility.’” Id. at 639 (quoting Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968)). That
statement implies that the state may defer to parents when children’s well-being is at risk.
When children are not vulnerable to cognizable harms, their well-being is not at risk.
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they do not conform to majoritarian community norms.180 In essence, the
Court has stated that the government’s desire for children to conform to
majoritarian norms is not reason enough to infringe children’s identity
interests. The Court has repeatedly protected children’s ability to explore
and express unorthodox values associated with minority identities. This
protection comports with the pluralism principle’s ªrst prong. The Court
has only infringed upon children’s identity interests in cases where doing
so prevented harms that are cognizable under the pluralism principle’s
second prong.181
1. Protecting Identity Interests
a. Foundational Cases
The Court planted the seed of the pluralism principle in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette.182 Barnette was not formally a
children’s rights case because parents brought the suit, but Justice Jackson, writing for the plurality, suggested that children’s rights were at stake. 183
The parents challenged a state statute that compelled students to salute the
American ºag and recite the Pledge of Allegiance.184 Jackson recognized
that students’ interests in developing their religious and political identities were at stake in the case.185
Jackson stated that the compelled salute and pledge violated constitutional protections of free expression and free religious exercise and could
not be justiªed by the state’s desire to assimilate children to a uniªed standard of nationalism.186 The children were vulnerable to adopting unorthodox values, but Jackson reasoned that the possibility of children adopting
“eccentricity and abnormal attitudes” did not justify restricting the students’ constitutional rights.187 This prioritization of identity interests over
assimilation is consistent with the pluralism principle’s ªrst prong. Jackson also noted that students’ deviation from majoritarian standards of nationalism did not threaten national security.188 If national security were
threatened, the school’s policy would have been constitutional.189 That logic

180

See infra Part III.A.1.
See infra Parts III.A.2–3.
182 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
183 See id. at 630–31 (“The State . . . coerce[s school] attendance by punishing both
parent and child. The latter stand on a right of self-determination in matters that touch
individual opinion and personal attitude.”).
184 Id. at 625–30.
185 See id. at 634–36 (noting that students’ “religious views” as well as “matters of
opinion and political attitude” were implicated).
186 See id. at 642.
187 Id.
188 Id. at 640.
189 Id.
181
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comports with the pluralism principle’s second prong because a threat to
national security would qualify as a cognizable harm.
After Barnette planted the pluralism principle’s seed, the principle
sprouted in the later cases of Tinker v. Des Moines,190 Island Trees Union
Free School District v. Pico,191 and Carey v. Population Services International.192 In Tinker, the Court upheld secondary students’ First Amendment
right to protest the Vietnam War in school.193 The Court stated that, even
though the protests exposed vulnerable children to controversy, that did
not justify infringing students’ rights to express their political identity.194
The Court stated that public schools may not censor students’ speech just
because the speech is unpopular or unpleasant to the community.195 Put differently, the Court again protected children’s ability to explore and to commit to values associated with identities that are out of the mainstream.
The Court did make two exceptions: public schools may restrict speech if
it impinges upon the rights of other students to be free and let alone or if
it is substantially disruptive.196 These exceptions comport with the pluralism principle’s second prong because they both prevent cognizable harms.
Island Trees Union Free School District v. Pico, which dealt with the
removal of controversial books from public school libraries,197 reinforced
the pluralism principle. The school board argued that removing the books
was necessary “to protect the children in our schools from . . . moral danger.”198 Writing for the plurality, Justice Brennan noted that schools do have
an interest in inculcating children with values, but that interest alone cannot
justify limiting children’s First Amendment rights.199 Justice Brennan’s opinion held that “local school boards may not remove books from school
library shelves simply because they dislike the ideas contained in those
books and seek by their removal to ‘prescribe what shall be orthodox in
politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion.’”200 By removing controversial books, the school board delegitimized minority values
190

393 U.S. 503 (1969).
457 U.S. 853 (1982).
431 U.S. 678 (1977).
193 393 U.S. at 514. Tinker is the ªrst case in the Court’s trilogy on student speech. The
second case in the trilogy is Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986),
which speciªcally governs low-value speech, such as obscene and indecent speech, and is
discussed in Part III.B.1.b, infra. The third case, Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484
U.S. 260 (1988), governs school-sponsored speech, such as school-run newspapers, and is
discussed in notes 262–265 and accompanying text, infra.
194 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 510–11.
195 See id. at 509.
196 See id. at 508–09, 514.
197 The school board claimed that the books were “anti-American” and “offensive to
. . . Americans in general.” 457 U.S. at 873 (quoting Pico v. Bd. of Educ., Island Trees
Union Free Sch. Dist., 474 F. Supp. 387, 390 (E.D.N.Y. 1979)).
198 Id. at 857 (quoting Pico v. Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist., 474 F.
Supp. 387, 390 (E.D.N.Y. 1979)).
199 See id. at 864.
200 Id. at 872 (citing W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)).
191
192
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and goals that conºicted with majoritarian community values. Brennan
suggested that the community’s desire to protect children from “moral danger” did not justify reducing children’s First Amendment rights.201 In Pico,
the Court again protected children’s ability to explore minority identities,
while reiterating that nonconformity is not in and of itself a “danger.”
The privacy case of Carey v. Population Services International is also
consistent with the pluralism principle. In Carey, the Court invalidated a
New York statutory provision that banned the sale of contraceptives to minors under the age of sixteen, except when deemed appropriate by the minors’ physicians.202 New York contended that its law was “permissible as
a regulation of the morality of minors in furtherance of the State’s policy
against promiscuous sexual intercourse among the young.”203
Although the Court did not say so explicitly, identity interests were
at stake in Carey because the government was seeking to assimilate children to the sexual mores of majoritarian identity groups. In addition, identity
interests were at stake because intimate relationships can inform one’s sense
of self.204 The plurality recognized that New York had a legitimate reason
for limiting promiscuous sex among teenagers: the prevention of physical
and psychological harms associated with adolescent intercourse, especially
the physical and psychological harms that teenage motherhood imposes
on the mother and child.205 The plurality did not believe that merely sending a moral message to youth could credibly curb those physical and psychological harms.206 Critically, however, sending a moral message was not in
and of itself a legitimate reason for reducing minors’ rights.207 By invoking physical and psychological harms as the only way the state could have
justiªed its law, the plurality adhered to the pluralism principle’s second
prong. The Court was not making a culturally subjective judgment regarding
sexual mores, but was concerned about both the enduring consequences of
teenage intercourse and the harms that such intercourse imposes on others,
namely children resulting from the intercourse.208
In Barnette, Tinker, Pico, and Carey, the Court did not analyze all
three of the factors identiªed in Bellotti: vulnerability, maturity, and deference to parents. In these cases, the Court focused on analyzing whether
201

See id. at 857.
Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l., 431 U.S. 678, 681–82 (1977).
203 Id. at 692.
204 See Karst, supra note 172, at 628 (discussing the relationship between intimate associations and personal identities).
205 In discussing the risks of sexual activity among youth, the Court noted numerous
physical and psychological harms but did not raise any social or moral concerns. See, e.g.,
Carey, 431 U.S. at 696 n.21 (“[T]eenage motherhood involves a host of problems, including adverse physical and psychological effects upon the minor and her baby.” (internal
quotation marks and brackets omitted)).
206 See id. at 696.
207 See id. at 697.
208 See id. at 696 n.21 (noting pregnancy’s “physical and psychological effects upon
the minor and her baby”).
202
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children were vulnerable to harms. Those analyses were driven, at least implicitly, by the pluralism principle. In each case, the state sought to limit
children’s ability to explore or express values and goals associated with
minority identities to protect children from straying from community norms.
In each case, the Court stated that nonconformity is not inherently harmful and then protected children’s identity interests by extending the constitutional rights of adults to children. In these cases, the Court raised the
pluralism principle to shield children from a rights reduction.
b. Deconstructing Potential Challenges
The Supreme Court case that potentially challenges the pluralism
principle is Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser,209 a subsequent case
involving vulgar speech. The Court held that a high school did not violate
the First Amendment by punishing a student who delivered a speech laced
with gratuitous sexual references.210 In the speech, Matthew Fraser nominated a classmate for student ofªce while referring to the candidate in
graphic sexual metaphors.211 Ultimately, as discussed below, Fraser does
not challenge the pluralism principle because no identity interests were at
stake.
Some commentators and lower courts wrongly view Fraser as implicitly overruling Tinker and granting schools broad discretion to censor
the expression of any ideas that they deem offensive.212 In such cases, the
pluralism principle is violated based on a misinterpretation of Fraser. Before reaching my analysis of Fraser, I consider one lower court example,
Boroff v. Van Wert City Board of Education.213
In Boroff, the Sixth Circuit upheld a school’s prohibition of T-shirts
featuring the musical performer Marilyn Manson.214 One T-shirt was critical of Christianity and another T-shirt had illustrations of Marilyn Manson “largely unadorned by text.”215 Citing Fraser, the court stated: “[t]he
209

478 U.S. 675 (1986).
Id. at 686 (plurality opinion).
211 Id. at 677–78.
212 See, e.g., Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d 731, 739 (7th Cir. 2005) (noting that Supreme
Court case law on student speech has become “difªcult to understand and apply”); Boroff
v. Van Wert City Bd. of Educ., 220 F.3d 465, 474 (6th Cir. 2001) (Gilman, J., dissenting)
(stating that the majority interpreted Fraser and Hazelwood School Bd. v. Kuhlmeier, 484
U.S. 260 (1988), as “essentially overruling Tinker”); Baxter v. Vigo County Sch. Corp., 26
F.3d 728, 737 (7th Cir. 1994) (asserting that Fraser “cast some doubt” on Tinker); David L.
Hudson & John E. Ferguson, A First Amendment Focus: The Courts’ Inconsistent Treatment of Bethel v. Fraser and the Curtailment of Student Rights, 36 J. Marshall L. Rev.
181, 183 (2002) (noting that some courts have relied on Fraser to prohibit not just vulgar
and lewd speech but also ideas that school boards ªnd offensive).
213 220 F.3d 465 (6th Cir. 2000).
214 Id. at 465.
215 Id. at 469, 71. The T-shirt criticizing Christianity featured a “three-headed Jesus,”
the words “See No Truth. Hear No Truth. Speak No Truth.” on the front and the word
“BELIEVE” with “LIE” highlighted on the back. Id. at 469.
210
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Supreme Court has held that the school board has the authority to determine what manner of speech in the classroom or in school is appropriate.”216 The court concluded that the rock artist “promotes disruptive and
demoralizing values,” and the T-shirts “were determined to be vulgar,
offensive, and contrary to the education mission of the school.”217
Identity interests were at stake in Boroff. Commentators have noted
that Marilyn Manson’s music has a value-laden agenda: to challenge the
gender binary, to question mainstream American values, to champion individuality, and to have people take responsibility for their actions.218 Commentators have also noted that Marilyn Manson’s values are consonant
with queer identity.219 Because of the identity interests involved, the Boroff
majority violated the pluralism principle. The principle protects children’s identity interests: the ability to explore and express values and
goals that shape their identities. Invoking community norms without pointing out cognizable harms as the Boroff court did is insufªcient justiªcation
for infringing identity interests.
The school administrators in Boroff were particularly troubled by the
shirt that conveyed anti-Christian sentiments.220 The court would have adhered to the pluralism principle had it reasoned that the anti-Christianity
T-shirt amounted to hate speech, thereby harming other students.221 Similarly, the court would have adhered to the pluralism principle had it reasoned that Marilyn Manson T-shirts incited students to harm themselves,
for example by engaging in drug use.222 Instead of doing so, the court simply
asserted that both T-shirts contravened school morals and thus were subject
to regulation.223
Contrary to the Boroff court’s interpretation, however, Fraser does
not afford schools with broad discretion to assimilate children to community
norms as the school did in Boroff. Correctly understood, Fraser suggested that schools may censor “low-value”224 language but not offensive
ideas.225 The Court described the language, not the ideas, in Fraser’s speech
216

Id. at 470.
Id. at 471.
218 See Jeff Q. Bostic et al., From Alice Cooper to Marilyn Manson: The Signiªcance
of Adolescent Antiheroes, 27 Acad. Psych. 54 (2003); Judith A. Peraino, Listening to the
Sirens: Music as Queer Ethical Practice, 9 GLQ: J. Lesbian & Gay Stud. 433 (2003).
219 See Peraino, supra note 218.
220 See id. at 469.
221 See supra Part II.B.2.
222 See id.
223 Boroff, 220 F.3d at 471.
224 Cf. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942) (“There are certain
well-deªned and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of
which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd
and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or ‘ªghting’ words.”).
225 See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 689 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“There is no suggestion that
school ofªcials attempted to regulate [Fraser’s] speech because they disagreed with the
views he sought to express.”); Harper v. Poway Uniªed Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1193
(9th Cir. 2006) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (“‘[P]lainly offensive’ under Fraser is determined
217
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as “obscene,” “vulgar,” “lewd,” and “offensively lewd.”226 In cases involving adult speakers and child speakers alike, the Court has repeatedly stated
that such expression is not just offensive;227 it is of low value and thus
subject to reduced First Amendment protection, if any at all.228 According
to the Court, obscene and indecent expressions are low value because “such
utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of . . .
slight social value as a step to truth.”229
Unlike the gratuitous sexual remarks made by the student in Fraser,
expressions of identity are anything but low value. Expressions of identity are expositions of ideas, although such expositions may be coded and
implicit. Recall that identities are commitments to speciªc values and goals
with regard to particular social categories.230 Thus, expressions of identities are expressions of ideas, endorsements of particular values and goals.
The student who wears kente scarves to express her African American
identity is endorsing values that she associates with African Americans.
The student who wears a Marilyn Manson T-shirt to express her queer
identity is also endorsing a particular set of values.
Expression of one’s identity also is not low-value speech because
expression of one’s identity is a form of self-realization. Jurists have touted
the facilitation of self-realization as being one of the reasons why the Constitution protects free speech.231 Expressions of identity are especially valuable for adolescents because realizing one’s sense of self is the primary
psychosocial developmental task of adolescence.232
Had Fraser argued that his use of sexual language was itself a substantive message (which he did not), his case would have posed a more difªcult question. He might have argued that his use of sexual language was a
political statement against his school’s rule against sexual language. As
an expression of political ideology, the student’s speech would not be of
low value. Nonetheless, under the pluralism principle, the school still would
have been able to intervene under the second prong, because treating rule
breaking itself as protected speech would plant the seeds of anarchy. The
by the language used, not the idea conveyed.”); East High Gay/Straight Alliance v. Bd. of
Educ. of Salt Lake City Sch. Dist., 81 F. Supp. 2d 1166, 1193 (D. Utah 1999) (“Fraser
speaks to the form and manner of student speech, not its substance. It addresses the mode
of expression, not its content or viewpoint.”).
226 See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring) (summarizing the Court’s description of the speech in question).
227 See FCC v. Paciªca Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745–46 (1978).
228 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973); see also Ashcroft v. Free Speech
Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 265 (2002); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 865 (1997); Paciªca Found.,
438 U.S. at 745–47.
229 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685 (quoting Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572).
230 See supra Part I.B.
231 “‘Self-realization’ theories of the First Amendment stress the relationship between
free expression and personal fulªllment . . . [which includes] developing a self-identity.”
Daniel A. Farber, The First Amendment 3–4 (2d ed. 2003). However, self-realization
theories of free speech have never been absolute. Id. at 4.
232 See supra Part I.B.
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disorder that would ensue is a cognizable harm, as it would compromise
other students’ interests in security and public education.
Note that the government may regulate many areas of children’s expression, not just obscene and indecent speech, without implicating identity interests. The pluralism principle only protects children’s exercise of
identity interests and not free expression generally. Therefore, a teacher
can mandate that students raise their hands rather than randomly shout
responses to the teacher’s questions; mandate silent reading time; deduct
points for students’ poor grammar;233 and discipline cheaters by having them
write “I will not cheat” one hundred times on the whiteboard. In each of
these instances, children are unlikely to argue that restrictions on their
expression undermine identity interests. Thus, the pluralism principle is
not implicated.
2. Preventing Cognizable Harms
a. Binding Commitments as Harms to Self
While the cases just discussed dealt primarily with the pluralism principle’s ªrst prong, other cases reinforce the second prong, which dictates
that the government can infringe identity interests to prevent the cognizable harms deªned in Part II.B. Consider Bellotti, in which the Court addressed whether pregnant teenagers should have the same constitutional
right as pregnant adults to make reproductive decisions.234 The State of Massachusetts had a statute that required pregnant teenagers to procure either
parental consent or a judicial bypass prior to undergoing an abortion.235
The Court stated that a pregnant teen is entitled to a judicial bypass if,
upon a hearing, a judge ªnds that the teen is “mature enough and well
enough informed to make her abortion decision” or that “the desired abortion would be in her best interests.”236 In so holding, the Court suggested
that minors do not have the same reproductive rights as adults because
minors who face decisions regarding abortion are vulnerable to cognizable
harms.
The law in Bellotti implicated identity interests by precluding many
teenage women from making reproductive choices based on their own reli-

233 One might argue that requiring students to use “standard” English in assignments is
an assimilation demand on, for example, Ebonics speakers. Drawing from the writings of
Lisa Delpit, I believe that requiring students to learn standard English is not a coercive assimilation demand, as long as teachers do not denigrate Ebonics as inherently “wrong” or
“deªcient.” Teachers can simultaneously afªrm the cultural worth of Ebonics and require
students to learn standard English because of its practical value. See Lisa Delpit, What
Should Teachers Do About Ebonics?, in Tongue Tied: The Lives of Multilingual
Children in Public Education (Otto Santa Ana ed., 2004)).
234 Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979).
235 Id. at 625–26.
236 Id. at 643–44.
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gious and moral sensibilities. The Bellotti decision required teenage women
to assimilate to speciªc religious and cultural norms. While the Court noted
that abortion decisions raise “profound moral and religious concerns,”237
it emphasized that abortion is ultimately a medical decision with irreversible
consequences.238 Reading Bellotti in light of the Court’s larger jurisprudence on children’s rights suggests that the morality and religious concerns were aggravating but not dispositive factors.239 Rather, the Court seems
to have been swayed by the long-term consequences involved in medical
decisionmaking. By emphasizing the irreversible nature of abortions, the
Court invoked the pluralism principle’s second prong.
Because the Court determined that teenagers facing abortion decisions are vulnerable to cognizable harms, the other two Bellotti factors—
deference to parents and maturity—came into play. The Court upheld the
government’s deference to parents on whether their daughters should receive abortions, but maintained that daughters could trump that deference
by proving to judges that they were mature.240
Veronica School District v. Acton241 also supports the pluralism principle’s second prong. In Acton, the Court upheld a school’s policy of randomly testing student athletes for drug use.242 The Court upheld the tests,
over a Fourth Amendment challenge, by invoking a compelling government interest in preventing a cognizable harm: the long-term bodily consequences of drug use.243 The Court invoked the harms of drug use to reduce children’s constitutional rights, emphasizing at length not only the
harmful physical and psychological consequences of drugs generally,244 but
also the enduring effects they have on children speciªcally.245 The case
did not implicate identity interests. However, by emphasizing that drug use
is harmful because it binds children to long-term bodily consequences, the
237

Id. at 640.
Id. at 640–42 (noting abortion’s long-term consequences, medical nature, and legal
implications).
239 See supra Part III.B.1 (discussing cases in which the Court stated that cultural and
moral norms alone are not sufªcient reasons to reduce children’s constitutional rights). In
particular, recall that in Carey v. Populations Servs. Int’l, the Court stated that moral reasons were not enough to justify a New York law that limited the sale of contraceptives to
minors. See 431 U.S. 678, 719 (1977).
240 Pregnant teenagers could bypass the statute’s parental consent component through a
judicial hearing in which they proved themselves to be mature or proved that an abortion
was in their best interest, regardless of their maturity. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 643–44.
For a case similar to Bellotti, consider Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979). In Parham, the Court upheld a statute that empowered parents to commit their children to psychiatric institutions against their children’s will. Id. The Court reduced children’s autonomy rights by granting power to their parents only after establishing that medical harms
were central to the case. Id. at 609.
241 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
242 Id.
243 Id. at 660–65; see also New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 338 (1985) (noting that
schools have a legitimate interest in preventing drug use).
244 See Acton, 515 U.S. at 662.
245 See id. at 661.
238

2007]

Pluralism: A Principle for Children’s Rights

357

Court lent support to the deªnition of “cognizable harm” in the pluralism
principle’s second prong.
Interestingly, the Court emphasized that the tests only looked for drugs
and not diabetes, epilepsy, teen pregnancy, or other stigmatized medical
statuses.246 One element of the tests that did give the Court pause was the
requirement that students give advance disclosure of prescription drug use,
so as to avoid false positives.247 Interestingly, the Court only paused when
children’s identity interests had the possibility of being unduly compromised—when the school may have “outed” students as belonging to a
potentially stigmatized identity group based on medical status.248 This attention to identity interests thus lends further support to the pluralism principle’s ªrst prong.
b. Harms to Others
The ªnal type of equal rights cases arises when a government’s efforts to protect children’s identity interests are trumped by its efforts to
prevent harms to others. Tinker, discussed above, made room for government intervention in these cases. Tinker held that students have freedom
of expression in schools, but that schools may limit that freedom when a
student’s expression substantially disrupts class or when a student’s expression impinges upon the rights of others to be free and let alone.249 The
ªrst exception speciªcally prevents students from violating other students’ interests in public education and in an educational environment free
of physical disturbance.250 The second exception is a broad provision that
protects others’ interests more generally.251
Another case on student expression, Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,252 can also be read to support the pluralism principle’s second prong.
Kuhlmeier leaves room for interpretation that affects its relationship to
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See id. at 658.
Id. at 659–60. The Court ultimately decided that students could give advance disclosure in a conªdential manner, thus mitigating privacy concerns. Id. at 660.
248 Disclosing individuals’ membership in stigmatized identity groups against their will
can negatively inºuence those individuals’ identity development. See infra Part IV.C (discussing the disclosure of individuals’ sexual orientation); see also James P. Madigan,
Questioning the Coercive Effect of Self-Identifying Speech, 87 Iowa L. Rev. 75 (2001).
249 See Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 U.S. 503, 508–09, 514 (1969).
250 Courts generally have stated that schools invoking the substantial disruption exception must show that there is a risk of physical disturbance, but courts have afforded schools
varying degrees of discretion to forecast and deªne physical disturbances. See generally
Royal C. Gardner, III, Case Note, Protecting a School’s Interest in Value Inculcation to the
Detriment of Students’ Free Expression Rights: Bethel School District v. Fraser, 28 B.C. L.
Rev. 595, 603–05 (1987); Kathleen Hart, Note, Sticks and Stones and Shotguns at Schools:
The Ineffectiveness of Constitutional Antibullying Legislation as a Response to School Violence, 39 Ga. L. Rev. 1109, 1138 (2005).
251 Cases almost never rest on the rights-of-others exception. See infra note 277. But
see Harper v. Poway Uniªed Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2006).
252 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
247
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the pluralism principle. At best, Kuhlmeier lends full support to the pluralism principle; at worst, Kuhlmeier stands for the proposition that, when
the line between student speech and the school’s own speech is blurred,
the school may deªne cognizable harms more capaciously than the pluralism principle does.
In Kuhlmeier, students challenged censorship of two articles in a student newspaper.253 At the outset, the Court distinguished Kuhlmeier from
Tinker. The Court reasoned that children have reduced First Amendment
rights when they are speaking through a school-sponsored newspaper because the newspaper bears the school’s imprimatur.254 In Tinker, the student protest happened to be on school grounds, but the school did not sponsor the protest.255 Because a school-sponsored newspaper bears the school’s
imprimatur, people may reasonably attribute opinions in the newspaper to
the school, blurring the line between the speech of the student and that of
the school.256 As a result of this blurring, the Court declared that schools
may censor school-sponsored speech “so long as their actions are reasonably
related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”257
The holding in Kuhlmeier required the determination of what constitutes a legitimate pedagogical concern. The Kuhlmeier Court held that the
ªrst article, which addressed the impact of divorce on students, was censored for legitimate pedagogical reasons.258 The school refused to publish
the article partly because its author’s inadequate research did not satisfy
journalistic standards.259 Indeed, requiring thorough and unbiased research, proper spelling, correct grammar, and the like seems to be directly
related to pedagogy. Here, the difference between pure student speech and
school-sponsored speech becomes clear: a school can refuse to publish an
article in the school newspaper because of poor grammar or poor research,
but it cannot ban an antiwar protest that happens to be on school grounds
just because the protesters are speaking with poor grammar and making
poorly researched arguments.
In addition, the school was concerned that the article on divorce compromised the privacy of some parents.260 The school was concerned that
the second article also threatened privacy interests. The second article,
which addressed student pregnancies, did not adequately protect the ano-
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Id. at 260.
See id. at 270–71.
See id.
256 See id.
257 Id. at 273.
258 See id. at 273–75.
259 The author of the article failed to interview a divorcée whom the author sharply
criticized. See id. at 274–75. A professional newspaper editor and a former college journalism instructor both testiªed that the author’s reporting did not meet journalistic standards.
See id. at 275 n.8.
260 See id. at 263, 275.
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nymity of the students interviewed for the piece.261 Thus, the school principal feared that the article would jeopardize the privacy interests of the
students interviewed, their boyfriends, and their families.262 Protecting those
individuals’ privacy interests constituted a legitimate pedagogical goal.263
In fact, most of the Court’s analysis was devoted to discussing this pedagogical goal of preventing harm to others’ privacy.264
As analyzed thus far, the school’s refusal to publish the two articles
supports the pluralism principle. The censorship was not based on a desire to
limit the underlying ideas. The censorship was motivated in part by the
school’s desire to prevent cognizable harms to others, in this case, threats
to others’ privacy. Insofar as poor research justiªed censorship, the censorship did not delegitimize the author’s opinion, which may have been
central to her identity. Censoring for poor research does not undermine identity interests.
A small component of the Kuhlmeier opinion may, however, conºict
with the pluralism principle. In addition to discussing the pedagogical concerns already listed, the Court mentioned that the school was reasonable
in its concern that the pregnancy article’s discussion of sexual activity and
birth control might be “inappropriate” for the school’s freshmen and for the
“even younger brothers and sisters” of students who may bring the school
newspaper home.265 It is unclear whether that concern was purely a moral
concern, which would not amount to a cognizable harm under the pluralism
principle, or rather was a concern that the article might encourage younger
students and siblings, who may not be adequately informed about sex, to
explore potentially irresponsible or dangerous sexual activity. The latter
concern would amount to a cognizable harm under the pluralism principle.
By emphasizing the article’s impact on younger students, the Court
seemed to imply that the school was concerned about something more than
mere moralism. The Court could have said that instilling a sense of morality was itself a legitimate pedagogical concern. Instead, it said that the
article’s impact on younger children was a legitimate concern. The agespeciªc nature of the Court’s reasoning suggests that there was concern
about more than just a moral harm.
C. The Principle and Children’s Special Rights
The cases cited above concerning whether children should have the
same rights as adults constitute the majority of the Court’s children’s rights
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See id. at 274.
See id.
See id. at 274–75.
264 At least one lower court has interpreted the protection of privacy as the dispositive
factor in the Court’s decision in Kuhlmeier. See Hansen v. Ann Arbor Pub. Sch., 293 F.
Supp. 2d 780, 795 (E.D. Mich. 2003).
265 Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 274–75.
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cases. However, in a small but growing number of cases, the Court has considered whether children should have greater constitutionally protected
negative liberties than adults and has answered in the afªrmative.
In Bellotti v. Baird, the Court noted that children’s rights cannot be
equated with those of adults.266 When children’s rights are not equal to those
of adults, however, they need not be less. Bellotti reminds us that courts
must apply constitutional principles “with sensitivity” to “children’s vulnerability and their needs for concern, sympathy, and paternal attention.”267
That sensitivity may require courts to grant children greater, not lesser,
negative liberties, which have been referred to as children’s special rights.268
Speciªcally, courts should be sensitive to children’s vulnerability to the
identity-related harms discussed in Part I.
Properly understood, Brown v. Board of Education269 was the ªrst case
on children’s special constitutional rights. In Brown, the Court explained
that segregated schools inºicted identity-related harms speciªcally on children,270 even if segregated schools were equal by tangible measures such
as physical facilities.271 Segregating children because of their race “generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may
affect [children’s] hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.”272
The implied inferiority resulting from racial segregation hinders racial
minorities’ identity development.273 The Court held that segregated schools
were unconstitutional, even if the schools were equal by tangible terms.274
In Brown, the Court emphasized that segregation was particularly
harmful to children.275 Accordingly, its explicit holding only spoke to the
266

443 U.S. 622, 633 (1979).
Id. at 633–36.
268 See supra note 168.
269 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
270 I should note that many commentators have criticized Brown’s use of social science
literature to discuss developmental harms for being crude and problematic. See, e.g., Garrick B. Pursley, Thinking Diversity, Rethinking Race: Toward a Transformative Concept of
Diversity in Higher Education, 82 Tex. L. Rev. 153, 154 n.8 (2003) (noting that this aspect
of Brown “has generated an entire body of scholarship critical of such an approach”). These
criticisms should not lead jurists to ignore insights from social science; rather, they should
prompt greater interdisciplinary dialogue in order to improve the way jurists draw from
social science. See Anne C. Dailey, Developing Citizens, 91 Iowa L. Rev. 431, 445–54
(2006) (supporting the Court’s more recent steps to integrate psychology “into constitutional decisionmaking”); Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in
Employment Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 Cal. L. Rev.
997, 1005–08 (2006) (providing an example of an appropriate way in which the courts can
utilize social science theories within their jurisprudence); Michael Heise, Brown v. Board
of Education, Footnote Eleven, and Multidisciplinarity, 90 Cornell L. Rev. 279, 307–18
(2005) (showing that Brown has fueled greater multidisciplinarity in court decisions and
legal scholarship).
271 See Brown, 347 U.S. at 493–94.
272 Id. at 494.
273 See supra notes 47–48 and accompanying text (discussing the relationship between
racial stigma and sense of self).
274 Brown, 347 U.S. at 493.
275 Id. at 494 (noting that criticisms of racial segregation “apply with added force to
267
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context of public schools, that is, the context of children.276 Today, Brown
is rarely thought of as a case of children’s special rights because legislators and the Court have rightly extended Brown’s holding against racial
segregation to adult contexts such as public transportation and other public accommodations.277 When Brown was decided, however, it granted special rights to children because its explicit holding was so narrow.278
Surely, Brown was not about assimilation demands; it concerned quite
the opposite. Nonetheless, the Court implicitly invoked identity interests
to justify special rights for children. Reframed with regard to the pluralism
principle, the Court determined that the state could not justify its socialization policy of segregated schools, because children’s identity development was at risk and the state did not invoke any cognizable harm.
A second case worth mentioning is Roper v. Simmons, in which the
Court held that children have a categorical right under the Eighth Amendment to be free from the death penalty, even though adults do not.279 The
pluralism principle does not apply to Roper because identity interests were
not at stake; however, I highlight Roper because it created special rights
for children and the Roper majority acknowledged that children’s vulnerabilities led to that outcome. Children’s “vulnerability and comparative lack
of control over their immediate surroundings mean juveniles have a greater
claim than adults to be forgiven for failing to escape negative inºuences
in their whole environment.”280
As Emily Buss put it, courts should sometimes extend heightened
constitutional protections to children in order to “maintain[ ] ªdelity to the
principles animating constitutional rights.”281 Together, Brown and Roper
show that, after examining children’s particular vulnerabilities, the Court
has indeed extended special rights to children in order to satisfy constitutional principles.282 Similarly, to the extent that constitutional provisions
are meant to protect identity interests, they may necessitate special rights
children in grade and high schools”).
276 See Michael Heise, Litigated Learning and the Limits of Law, 57 Vand. L. Rev.
2417, 2419 (2004) [hereinafter Heise, Litigated Learning] (noting that Brown did not expressly overrule Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)).
277 See Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968) (prison); Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S.
61 (1963) (courtroom); New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass’n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54
(1958) (city park); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (city bus); Holmes v. City of
Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (municipal golf course); Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350
U.S. 877 (1955) (public beach and bathhouse); see also Carlton Waterhouse, Avoiding Another
Step in a Series of Unfortunate Legal Events: A Consideration of Black Life Under American Law from 1619 to 1972 and a Challenge to Prevailing Notions of Legally Based Reparations, 26 B.C. Third World L.J. 207, 247–48 (2006) (describing how Congress and
federal courts extended desegregation to different contexts post-Brown).
278 See Heise, Litigated Learning, supra note 276.
279 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005).
280 Id. at 553.
281 Buss, Allocating Developmental Control, supra note 17, at 35.
282 For an argument that staying true to constitutional principles requires granting children special rights, see generally Buss, Constitutional Fidelity, supra note 145, at 355.
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for children because children are particularly vulnerable to threats against
their identity development.
IV. Applying the Pluralism Principle: A Case Study on Gay and
Lesbian Youth
As discussed in Part III, the pluralism principle already seems to
drive the Supreme Court’s existing children’s rights jurisprudence. The Supreme Court and lower courts should explicitly recognize and implement
the pluralism principle in future disputes regarding children’s constitutional rights. The rights of gay and lesbian youth provide fertile ground
for a case study on the pluralism principle’s applicability to future disputes.
The rights of gay and lesbian youth have become a highly contested
area of law. In the past year, nineteen state legislatures considered bills
that proposed either expanding or limiting the rights of gay and lesbian
youth in public schools.283 Similarly, numerous courts across the country
are wrestling with how to deªne the rights of gay and lesbian students.284
Deliberations in legislatures and courthouses have produced inconsistent
results.
In this Part, I discuss how courts should decide the constitutionality
of state policies affecting the identity development and expression of gay
and lesbian youth. The sketches in this Part are drawn in broad strokes because particular cases are highly fact speciªc. Nonetheless, these sketches
illustrate how the pluralism principle should guide judicial analysis.
First, I discuss school policies that restrict students from joining
noncurricular student groups that promote gay pride. I then address school
policies that protect gay and lesbian youth from hate speech. Finally, I
discuss the pending case of C.N. v. Wolf,285 in which a high school suspended
a lesbian student and outed her to her family because she hugged, kissed,
and held hands with her girlfriend on school grounds.
A. Free Expression
Student expression related to sexual orientation has become a contentious issue. Most of the debate has focused on the rights of secondary
students to participate in gay-straight alliances (“GSAs”), which are noncurricular student organizations dedicated to combating homophobia and
fostering welcoming school environments for gays and lesbians.286 Like
283 See Wyatt Buchanan, Bills Nationwide Address Gays in Schools: 19 States Have
More or Fewer Rights for Students on Agenda, S.F. Chron., Apr. 1, 2006, at B1.
284 See Michael Janofsky, Gay Rights Battleªelds Spread to Public Schools, N.Y.
Times, June 9, 2005, at A18.
285 410 F. Supp. 2d 894 (C.D. Cal. 2005).
286 For background on GSAs, see Gay Straight Alliance Network, http://www.gsanet
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other membership organizations, GSAs are expressive associations.287 For
many gay and lesbian youth, joining a GSA is an expression of gay pride.
For many other students, joining a GSA is an expression of support for the
gay community.
Most GSA-related litigation has involved the Equal Access Act
(“EAA”), a federal nondiscrimination law governing noncurricular student organizations.288 Based on the EAA, courts have held fairly consistently that, if a school allows any noncurricular student group to operate
on school grounds, it may not bar students from forming GSAs.289 In light
of these developments, some policymakers now seek to limit students’
access to GSAs by requiring students to obtain parental consent before participating.290 These policymakers are writing new laws to require parental
consent for participation in any noncurricular student group, so that there
is no disparate treatment between GSAs and other student groups.291
In August 2006, Georgia became the ªrst state to pass a statewide parental consent bill, which the governor signed into law.292 According to
Georgia’s law, parents do not need to sign a new consent form every time
their child joins a noncurricular organization; consent is assumed.293 However, parents may opt out and withdraw consent in writing for speciªc
clubs.294
As both a normative and legal matter, students in Georgia should be
able to raise the pluralism principle as a shield, defending themselves
against the rights reduction that the Georgia statute embodies. The principle protects students’ ability to develop and express their identities. Identity development requires exploring goals and values associated with different social categories; participating in student organizations is one way
to explore such identity-forming goals and values. As discussed above,
work.org/ (last visited Sept. 14, 2006).
287 For background on expressive associations and the First Amendment’s protection of
expressive association, see Farber, supra note 231, at 233–39.
288 According to the EAA, 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071–4074 (2000), if a public secondary
school receiving federal funds allows students to form noncurricular student groups at all,
it generally must allow students to form any noncurricular group they want, and it must
treat all noncurricular groups equally. The EAA makes exceptions, allowing schools to treat
particular groups differently when necessary to (1) maintain order and discipline, (2) protect
the well-being of students and faculty, or (3) prevent material and substantial interference
with the orderly conduct of educational activity. Id. §§ 4071(c)–(f); see also Sarah Orman,
Note, “Being Gay in Lubbock”: The Equal Access Act in Caudillo, 17 Hastings Women’s
L.J. 227, 231 (2006) (explaining exceptional circumstances under the EAA).
289 See Orman, supra note 288. But see Caudillo v. Lubbock Indep. Sch. Dist., 311 F.
Supp. 2d 550 (N.D. Tex. 2004) (ªnding that the sexual content in the group’s discussions
and online communications threatened students’ well-being and the school’s order and discipline).
290 See Buchanan, supra note 283.
291 Id.
292 For background on the Georgia law, see Merritt Melancon, Schools: Parents Not
Keeping Kids Out of Activities, Athens Banner-Herald, Aug. 28, 2006, at 1.
293 See id.
294 See id.
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joining student organizations is also a form of expression. Parental consent is an unjustiªed hurdle that blocks students’ exercise of identity interests. There is no categorical harm to joining student organizations, and
thus a categorical rule burdening children’s access to student organizations
is unjustiªed.
Based on the psychological literature discussed above, it is desirable
for schools to provide students with a safe space to explore their identities
without ªrst having to obtain parental permission. As James Marcia pointed
out, adolescents who simply adopt their parents’ values and goals without
exploring alternatives often fail to develop stable, mature identities.295
That is not to say that parental guidance is not an important part of children’s identity development; it is simply not the only part. The pluralism
principle balances parents’ inºuences at home with a degree of freedom
for adolescents to explore their identities in the public sphere, including
in their schools.
As a legal matter, consent requirements like Georgia’s do not run
afoul of the EAA, but they do violate students’ First Amendment rights.
Some might argue, problematically, that there is no Supreme Court case
law that is directly on point. Kuhlmeier does not apply because noncurricular student groups, unlike school-sponsored newspapers, constitute public forums.296 Fraser also does not apply because noncurricular student
groups do not categorically involve low-value obscene or indecent speech.297
However, Tinker does provide some guidance.
Advocates of the Georgia law might argue that Tinker can be distinguished because the school in Tinker barred speech entirely, rather than
requiring parental consent.298 Indeed, advocates of the Georgia statute have
noted that deference to parents has traditionally played a part in American law.299 Moreover, Bellotti identiªed deference to parents as one of the
factors in its three-factor test.300
With that said, the notion that Tinker does not control is ºawed and
Georgia’s parental consent law should be found unconstitutional. Typically, the Court has limited children’s rights by deferring to parents only
after ªnding that children were vulnerable to harms, as was the case in Bellotti.301 In the past, the Court’s analysis of whether children are vulnerable to harm has comported with the pluralism principle. That is to say, the
Court has rejected suggestions that nonconformity with the mainstream is
intrinsically harmful and instead has protected children’s ability to ex-
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See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 267 (1988).
297 For a discussion of Fraser, see supra Part III.B.1.b.
298 Students who join student organizations are “speaking” in the sense that they are
expressing themselves through association. See Farber, supra note 231, at 233–39.
299 See Buchanan, supra note 283.
300 See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979).
301 See supra notes 176–177 and accompanying text.
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plore and express unpopular and unorthodox identities. The Court has only
reduced children’s rights upon a ªnding of the cognizable harms narrowly
deªned in Part II.C. Accordingly, Georgia’s categorical requirement of
parental consent is unconstitutional. Certainly, parents may wish to forbid
their children from participating in after-school programs. They are free
to take it upon themselves to withdraw their children from the programs.
However, as discussed above, the state is not allowed to pass any laws to
facilitate such parental wishes.302
B. Hate Speech
Another area of unsettled law involves hate speech in childhood contexts. First Amendment jurisprudence protects adults’ right to espouse
hate speech.303 However, the Supreme Court has not yet addressed whether
hate speech spoken by children to other children should be protected. As
described below, lower courts have reached divergent conclusions. Under
the pluralism principle, hate speech among children should not be protected
because, even though the speech may further the speaker’s sense of identity, it does so at the expense of her target’s identity interests. Hate speech
creates a cognizable harm by undermining other students’ identity development.304 In cases involving hate speech in schools, the state legitimately
can require child speakers to put down the shield of the pluralism principle,
because doing so prevents harms to others.
It is worth emphasizing at the outset that this Article only legitimizes
regulation of children’s hate speech in school contexts where children can
harm other children. Children’s constitutional rights have never been coextensive with those of adults. Accordingly, adults can have a right to espouse hate speech while children do not have a similar right.305
In Harper v. Poway Uniªed School District, the Ninth Circuit held that
Poway High School did not violate a student’s First Amendment rights
when it stopped the student from publicly condemning homosexuality.306
The school required the student to refrain from wearing T-shirts that
amounted to “verbal assaults” against gay and lesbian students.307 One Tshirt bore the slogans, “I WILL NOT ACCEPT WHAT GOD HAS CON-
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See supra Part II.C.2.a.
See Farber, supra note 231, at 107–17.
304 Hate speech in school denigrates other students as being inferior, which compromises those students’ identity development. For a more detailed theory of the cognizable
harms created by hate speech, see supra Part III.B.2.
305 Outside the context of hate speech, the Court already has given the government discretion to shield children from other forms of speech, even when the speaker is an adult.
See FCC v. Paciªca Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745–46 (1978) (rejecting a First Amendment
challenge to the FCC’s programming schedule, even though it relegated certain programs
to late nights because the FCC deemed the programs’ content unsuitable for children).
306 445 F.3d 1166, 1171 (2006).
307 See id. at 1178.
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DEMNED” and “HOMOSEXUALITY IS SHAMEFUL.”308 The second
T-shirt bore the slogans, “BE ASHAMED, OUR SCHOOL HAS EMBRACED WHAT GOD HAS CONDEMNED” and “HOMOSEXUALITY
IS SHAMEFUL.”309 The student wore these shirts in response to his high
school’s “Day of Silence,” which was intended to “teach tolerance of others,
particularly those of a different sexual orientation.”310 The Ninth Circuit
held that the student’s freedom of expression could be limited because his
expression infringed the rights of other students “to be secure and let alone”
and, thus, became unprotected speech under Tinker.311
Courts in other federal circuits have reached opposite conclusions in
similar cases. Most directly oppositional is Nixon v. Northern Local School
District Board of Education,312 in which a high school disciplined a student for wearing a T-shirt bearing the slogans, “Homosexuality is a sin!,”
“Islam is a lie!,” and “Abortion is murder!”313 The district court held that
the school violated the First Amendment because the student’s T-shirt did
not collide with the rights of other students to be secure and to be let
alone.314
In another case, Hansen v. Ann Arbor Public Schools, a district court
held that a school violated the First Amendment when it barred speakers
from condemning homosexuality on a Diversity Week panel discussion.315
Because the panel was a school-sponsored event, the court analyzed the
case under Kuhlmeier instead of under Tinker.316 In other words, the court
held that the school could limit student speech if it was “reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”317 The court acknowledged that
“to provide a safe and supportive environment for gay and lesbian students”
was a legitimate pedagogical goal.318 However, the court determined that
the school’s actions were not reasonably related to that goal. 319
The Ninth Circuit opinion in Harper comports with the pluralism
principle, while the latter two cases do not. The Ninth Circuit’s opinion
made history; it was the ªrst reported opinion to restrict student speech
308

Id. at 1171.
Id.
310 Id.
311 Id. at 1178. The Eleventh Circuit has taken another approach to preventing hate
speech. It has held that a school banning hate speech, in the form of the confederate ºag,
did not violate the First Amendment because Fraser permits schools to regulate civility in
schools broadly. See Denno v. Sch. Bd. Volusia County, Fla., 218 F.3d 1267, 1275 (11th
Cir. 2000). However, combating hate speech through Fraser is problematic because it stretches
the reasoning in Fraser too far. See supra notes 213–222 and accompanying text.
312 383 F. Supp. 2d 965 (S.D. Ohio 2005).
313 Id. at 967.
314 See id. at 974. The court also held that the student’s T-shirt did not cause substantial
disruption under Tinker and was not impermissible under Fraser. See id. at 971, 973.
315 293 F. Supp. 2d 780, 792–803 (E.D. Mich. 2003).
316 Id. at 793.
317 Id. at 796.
318 Id. at 802.
319 See id.
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by relying on Tinker’s rights-of-others exception.320 The fact that the Ninth
Circuit was trailblazing does not mean that its decision was wrong.
The Supreme Court has not explicitly elaborated what it means to interfere with the rights of other students “to be secure and to be let alone.”
To discern a meaning for those rights, jurists must look at children’s rights
jurisprudence generally, which I have demonstrated is guided by the pluralism principle.321 As discussed above, assimilation demands inºict psychological wounds,322 and hate speech is an assimilation demand because
it sends the message that an individual will be despised and denied respect unless she abandons or changes her identity.323 The Ninth Circuit was
correct to conclude that students’ right “to be free and to be let alone” includes a right to develop their identity free of psychological attacks in the
form of assimilation demands.324 This reasoning was used in Harper: “Being
secure involves not only freedom from physical assaults but from psychological attacks that cause young people to question their self-worth and their
rightful place in society.”325
Giving schools the authority to protect students from hate speech grants
them discretionary power, but that discretion is not atypical. Schools already have discretion when it comes to protecting children from other
harms. For example, they have more leeway in determining what types of
searches and seizures are “reasonable” in school contexts.326 Schools are
also afforded considerable discretion in determining whether student speech
would lead to substantial disruption that justiªes limiting student speech.327
Hate speech regulations simply put identity-related wounds on par with
physical wounds. Part I, which discussed the gravity of harm caused by
assimilation demands, suggests that this parity makes sense, especially in
childhood contexts. Children’s psychological wounds can lead to consequences as grave as depression and suicide, wounds that may never heal.
In contrast, a physical bruise, which schools already have discretion to
prevent, might heal in a matter of weeks.

320 See Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 217 (3d Cir. 2001) (noting
that “the precise scope of Tinker’s ‘interference with the rights of others’ language is unclear”); Nixon v. N. Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 383 F. Supp. 2d 965, 974 (S.D. Ohio
2005) (“[T]he [c]ourt is not aware of a single decision that has focused on [the rights-ofothers exception] in Tinker as the sole basis for upholding a school’s regulation of student
speech.”); Cindy Lavorato & John Saunders, Public High School Students, T-Shirts, and
Free Speech: Untangling the Knots, 209 Educ. Law Rep. 1, 9 (2006) (noting that the rightsof-others exception in Tinker “has been analyzed very little”).
321 See supra Part III.B.1.
322 See supra Part I.
323 Above, I deªned hate speech as statements sending the message that others “are to
be despised and denied respect because of their identity.” See supra notes 163–164 and accompanying text.
324 See Harper v. Poway Uniªed Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006).
325 Id.
326 See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 741 (1985).
327 See supra notes 249–250 and accompanying text.
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The district courts in Nixon and Hansen erred because they did not
take affronts to identity interests seriously. They both offered perfunctory
and conclusory assertions that the psychological harms of hate speech do
not affect students’ security.328 Both courts seemed to imply that only physical security matters.329 However, such a determination would be at odds with
both the pluralism principle and emerging patterns in Supreme Court jurisprudence.
C. Equal Protection and Privacy
Another current controversy is the pending case of high school student Charlene Nguon, who has brought an equal protection claim against
her high school for suspending her after she and her girlfriend held hands,
hugged, and kissed on school grounds.330 According to Nguon, her school
never punished opposite-sex couples for similar displays of affection.331
In addition, Nguon claims that her school violated her constitutionally protected right to privacy by outing her to her parents without her consent.332
If children’s rights were coextensive with adult’s rights, Nguon’s
claims would be straightforward as a matter of law. In Romer v. Evans, the
Supreme Court stated that animus towards gays and lesbians cannot be
the rational basis for any government policy that treats gays and lesbians
differently than straights.333 If Nguon’s school simply wanted to assimilate
her to a heteronormative environment, that would amount to nothing more
than mere animus toward gays and lesbians.334 However, since children’s
rights and adult’s rights are not coextensive, the school may try to argue
that it may reduce children’s rights to equal protection because it has an
interest in instilling majoritarian community values at school.335 Reading
328 See Nixon v. N. Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 383 F. Supp. 2d 965, 974 (S.D. Ohio
2005) (“[T]here is no evidence that [Nixon’s] silent, passive expression of opinion interfered with the work of Sheridan Middle School or collided with the rights of other students
to be let alone.”); Hansen v. Ann Arbor Pub. Sch., 293 F. Supp. 2d 780, 802 (E.D. Mich.
2003) (“Defendants fail to show why gays would be threatened or be made less ‘safe’ by
allowing the expression of . . . [a] viewpoint [condemning homosexuality].”).
329 A student in Harper similarly argued that only physical assault can infringe other
students’ right to be secure and let alone. See Harper, 445 F.3d at 1177. This narrow reading of the rights-of-others exception is problematic not only because psychological attacks
produce deep wounds, but also because it would be redundant with Tinker’s other exception; physical assaults would almost always amount to “substantial disruptions” of school
procedures.
330 See C.N. v. Wolf, 410 F. Supp. 2d 894 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (granting in part and denying in part defendants’ motion to dismiss); see also Mehta, supra note 8. As this Article
goes to publication, the decision in this case is pending.
331 See C.N., 410 F. Supp. 2d at 896.
332 See id.
333 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996).
334 See Yoshino, supra note 5, at 69–79 (discussing similar scenarios in the employment context and concluding that pressure to conform to heterosexual norms derives from
animus toward gays and lesbians).
335 A well-known equal protection case on sexual orientation-based bullying in schools
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children’s rights jurisprudence in light of the pluralism principle suggests
that the school should not prevail with this argument.
The Court has only reduced children’s rights in cases where the state
showed that children were vulnerable to harm.336 Comporting with the pluralism principle, the Court has not viewed nonconformity as a cognizable
harm.337 Moreover, the Court has protected children’s rights to explore
various identities.338 Thus, Nguon’s school would have difªculty justifying
its alleged disparate treatment by asserting that it sought to enforce students’
conformity to speciªc social values.339
A more difªcult question is whether Nguon has a valid privacy claim.
Her case would be easier if she had been entirely closeted, but she had already disclosed her sexual orientation at school. At least one lower court
has held that the right to privacy includes a right not to be outed by state
actors.340 However, in that case, there was no evidence that the outed party
had ever disclosed his sexual orientation to anyone other than his apparent sexual partner.341
An adult who has disclosed her sexual orientation to as many people
as Nguon had would likely have no valid privacy claim. The Supreme Court
has recognized that individuals’ constitutional right to privacy includes
“the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters.”342 It
has also recognized that “the fact that ‘an event is not wholly private
does not mean that an individual has no interest in limiting disclosure or
dissemination of information.’”343 However, adults’ rights to privacy cease to
exist once their “expectation of privacy” is no longer “reasonable.”344 Some
offers little guidance because the school in that case did not allege that it had a legitimate
state interest in discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation; it simply claimed that it
did not discriminate in the ªrst place. See Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446, 453 (7th Cir.
1996).
336 See supra Part III.B
337 See supra Part III.B.1.
338 See supra Part III.B.1.
339 Indeed, the principal in C.N. v. Wolf has focused on disputing the facts of the case
instead of making this rather weak legal argument. See Kelley-Anne Suarez, Passions Fill
O.C. Court in Trial Over Student Rights, L.A. Times, Dec. 13, 2006, at 1.
340 See Sterling v. Borough of Minersville, 232 F.3d 190, 192 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding
that police ofªcers violated a seventeen-year-old’s right to privacy by threatening to disclose his sexual orientation to his parents—a threat which precipitated the boy’s suicide);
see also Bloch v. Ribar, 156 F.3d 673 (6th Cir. 1998) (noting that public disclosure of information regarding sexuality compromises one’s privacy interests); Eastwood v. Dep’t of
Corr., 846 F.2d 627, 631 (10th Cir. 1988) (noting that the right to privacy “is implicated
when an individual is forced to disclose information regarding personal sexual matters”).
341 See Sterling, 232 F.3d at 192–93.
342 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1997); see also In re Crawford, 194 F.3d 954,
958–59 (9th Cir. 1999); Barry v. City of New York, 712 F.2d 1554, 1559 (2d Cir. 1983);
Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119, 1134 (5th Cir. 1978).
343 U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. 749, 770
(1989) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Justice William Rehnquist, Is an Expanded Right of Privacy Consistent with Fair and Effective Law Enforcement?, Nelson
Timothy Stephens Lectures at the University of Kansas Law School (Sept. 26–27, 1974)).
344 Although the Supreme Court has never applied the “reasonable expectation of pri-
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commentators believe that, as a general rule, once an individual is bold
enough to display same-sex affection in public, it is unreasonable for that
person to expect people not to disclose her sexual orientation to others.345
But children should not be—and have not been—subject to the same general
rules developed for adult contexts.
The privacy rights of children should be distinguished from those of
adults since a special right is sometimes necessary for childhood contexts.346
To discern whether children require a different legal test, jurists must ask
what principle is animating the right to privacy and whether furthering
that principle in childhood contexts requires heightening children’s privacy rights.347 The common view among courts and commentators is that
the principle of self-determination animates the right to privacy, speciªcally
the right to informational privacy.348 Taking self-determination seriously
requires affording individuals the ability to determine when to disclose sensitive facts about themselves, facts that, upon disclosure, may inhibit individuals’ ability to develop themselves. As Daniel Solove has pointed out,
“disclosure [of sensitive personal information] can prevent people from engaging in activities that further their own self-development . . . . Disclosure can inhibit people from associating with others, impinging upon freedom of association, and can also destroy anonymity, which is sometimes
critical for the promotion of free expression.”349
To maintain ªdelity to the notion of privacy rights, then, courts should
extend special rights of privacy to children when it is necessary to protect
their identity development.350 Youth are particularly vulnerable to the harms
of assimilation demands. By disclosing one’s sexual orientation, an individual becomes more susceptible to assimilation demands. For example,
youth who are outed to their parents may receive added pressure from their
parents to cease exploring their sexual identity. Indeed, courts have noted
vacy” test—which originated in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence—to informational privacy cases, numerous circuit courts have done so. See, e.g., Walls v. City of Petersburg,
895 F.2d 188, 192 (4th Cir. 1990) (“Personal, private information in which an individual
has a reasonable expectation of conªdentiality is protected by one’s constitutional right to
privacy.”); Kimberlin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 788 F.2d 434, 438 (7th Cir. 1986) (“Whether
or not Kimberlin has a privacy interest in the information . . . depends upon whether he has
a reasonable expectation of privacy in the information.”).
345 See Tamar Lewin, Openly Gay Student’s Lawsuit Over Privacy Will Proceed, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 2, 2005, at A21; cf. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (opining
in a Fourth Amendment case that “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public” is no
longer subject to constitutionally based privacy protections).
346 See supra note 281 and accompanying text.
347 See supra note 281 and accompanying text.
348 See Neil M. Richards, The Information Privacy Law Project, 94 Geo. L.J. 1087,
1095–120 (2006); Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. Pa. L. Rev. 477
(2006).
349 Solove, supra note 348, at 532.
350 Cf. James J. Tomkovicz, Beyond Secrecy for Secrecy’s Sake: Toward an Expanded
Vision of the Fourth Amendment Privacy Province, 36 Hastings L.J. 645, 698–704 (1985)
(proposing a similar Fourth Amendment test, under which privacy rights are protected on
the basis of “needs” instead of “expectations”).
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that disclosure of information regarding one’s sexual identity can greatly
alter one’s relationship with others, including one’s family.351
Because children are uniquely vulnerable to the harms of being outed,
there should be a categorical rule unique to children: the government should
not out gay and lesbian youth unless the government shows that doing so
prevents cognizable harms. For example, a public school might legitimately
out a lesbian student to her parents if doing so was part of a plan to intervene in the student’s imminent suicide attempt. The government should
never assume that a child’s being out in one social context (school) means
that the same child is out in another social context (home); such assumptions do not comport with research showing that youth are often out to
friends but not to family.352 A special categorical rule for children would not
be novel. In contexts such as capital punishment, the state already has extended special categorical protections to children.353 Moreover, special privacy rights for children comport with both the purpose of privacy rights
and the pluralism principle.
In terms of implementation, the categorical rule for children would
be easier to administer than the privacy test for adults. The inquiry for
adults’ informational privacy involves two difªcult questions: is the relevant information sensitive enough to trigger privacy interests and, if so,
has the adult relinquished her reasonable expectation of privacy by beginning a process of disclosure? Under the categorical rule for children, the
ªrst question is the only important one, except in rare cases where the
state has an interest in preventing cognizable harms.
One might contend that the categorical rule is nonetheless difªcult to
implement because a school may need to disclose a student’s sexual orientation to explain a rule infraction to parents. For example, if Charlene
and her girlfriend violated a globally enforced rule against kissing (which
did not implicate equal protection), how should the school explain the infraction to Charlene’s parents? If the rule were generally against kissing,
there would be no need to disclose information about Charlene’s partner’s
sex,354 just as there would be no need to disclose the partner’s race or religion. Quite simply, there will rarely be a need to disclose sexual orientation. So long as a school rule does not hinge on sexual orientation, sexual
351

See supra note 340.
See Savin-Williams, supra note 107; see also Todd Brower, Of Courts and Closets: A Doctrinal and Empirical Analysis of Lesbian and Gay Identity in Courts, 38 San
Diego L. Rev. 565, 567–68 (2001).
353 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
354 Attorneys for Charlene Nguon made this point during oral arguments. See Suarez,
supra note 339. Certainly, parents may be curious as to whom their child was kissing. They
should be encouraged to discuss those details with their child. Consider this analogy: if a
parent knows that her daughter chronicles her romantic life in a key-lock diary that she
keeps in her school locker, the parent should not be able to demand that the school conªscate
the diary, break the lock, and disclose her daughter’s secrets. Schools should not be allowed to
serve as an instrument used by parents to learn about their children’s secrets, unless the child
is at risk of cognizable harm.
352
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orientation does not need to be disclosed; meanwhile, any rule that hinges
on sexual orientation would implicate equal protection.
Conclusion
Assimilation demands are harmful to everyone, but they are particularly harmful to children. Therefore, the pluralism principle proposed in
this Article carries normative weight on its own. The fact that Supreme
Court jurisprudence supports the pluralism principle only furthers the principle’s persuasiveness.
The pluralism principle has been lurking right beneath the surface of
the Court’s opinions on children’s rights. Going forward, courts should implement the principle in a more self-aware, explicit, and systematic manner.
This Article only applied the pluralism principle to current controversies regarding the rights of gay and lesbian youth. The principle can
also guide how courts address issues involving other social categories. For
example, ethnic minority youth have unsuccessfully argued that schools’
grooming codes violated their First Amendment right to express ethnic
identity.355 Others have argued unsuccessfully that students should be protected against hate speech targeting religious minorities.356 This Article
aims to prompt policymakers, courts, and other commentators to reconsider the reasoning behind those cases and to approach similar cases in
the future with the pluralism principle in mind.

355 See New Rider v. Bd. of Educ., 480 F.2d 693 (10th Cir. 1973) (rejecting a First
Amendment challenge to a school grooming code with a hair-length requirement that prohibited Pawnee students from wearing traditional Native American hairstyles).
356 See, e.g., Nixon v. N. Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 383 F. Supp. 2d 965, 971 (S.D.
Ohio 2005) (holding that a school violated a student’s First Amendment rights by prohibiting the student from wearing to school a T-shirt that denigrated homosexuality and Islam).

